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Abstract 
Dignity ideas are experiencing a renaissance in modern American politics. Political leaders on 
the left and the right have invoked “human dignity” in efforts to justify their candidacies, their 
policies, and the political, economic, and sociocultural stories they wish to tell about the United 
States. There is, however, a lack of  treatment of these profoundly influential dignity ideas in 
political science literature. This thesis aims to correct this by demonstrating the centrality of 
dignity during the American Founding era and the “American Enlightenment” period more 
broadly. Along with liberalism and civic republicanism, this thesis documents the rise of 
“dignitarianism” as a new, distinct American political tradition. The interplay of dignitarian 
thinking with the liberal and republican traditions, along with strong influences from 
Enlightenment rationalism and Judeo-Christian theologies, yielded correlated strands of dignity 
thought: namely, “individual dignity” and “national dignity.” Using rich qualitative analysis of 
primary documents, supplemented by secondary literature, this thesis will argue that these 
conceptions of dignity played a powerful role in influencing Founding Americans’ views on 
equality and individual rights – specifically, freedom of conscience, free speech, privacy values, 
and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment – and the relationship of the citizenry to the 
nation. National dignity in particular played the strongest role in this latter development, 
informing American federalism, foreign policy, expansionism, and the treatment of citizens and 
non-citizens at home. At its best, national dignity advanced individual dignity claims in shows of 
solidarity, and served as a constructive tool for the building of a new nation. All too often, 
however, national dignitarianism succumbed to the allures of imperialism and rankism, 
dehumanizing citizens and non-citizens alike in the name of “national dignity.” The lessons of 
dignitarianism in the Founding era offers insights into contemporary dignity demands fueled by 
raging income inequalities, senses of political helplessness, and toxic, narrow nationalisms.  
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Introduction 
The Politics of Dignity 
 
 
 
 
As the 2010s came to a close, commentators have labeled the decade as one of growing 
anxiety, unraveling institutions, dissonant politics, and the “decade of distrust.”1 Fear has 
tyrannically dominated analysis of politics. Certainly, there is reason for alarm: right-wing 
populism has swept Europe and the United States; economic and political inequality are soaring; 
and the cause of human rights, the bedrock of the modern liberal world order, faces its greatest 
challenges since the Cold War as a rising number of nations embrace authoritarianism in the 
name of “the people.”2 In the United States, as in Hungary, Poland and India, there are concerns 
of the rise of “illiberal democracy.” The Ukraine scandal and the impeachment trial of Donald 
Trump, in particular, have tested faith in the rule of law. All the while, right-wing populists and 
authoritarians have dehumanized religious minorities, refugees, and immigrants as “out” groups.3  
American politics has always had illiberal traditions souring the hopes of “liberty, 
equality, and the pursuit of happiness.” As Rogers Smith, Ezra Klein, the editor of Vox, and 
 
1 “How Will History Books Remember the 2010s?” Politico Magazine. December 27, 2019. 
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/27/how-will-history-books-remember-the-2010s-089796.; 
Kakutani, Michiko. “The 2010s Were the End of Normal.” The New York Times. December 27, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/27/opinion/sunday/2010s-america-trump.html.  
2 Wolf, Martin. “The rise of the populist authoritarians.” Financial Times. January 22, 2019. 
https://www.ft.com/content/4faf6c4e-1d84-11e9-b2f7-97e4dbd3580d.  
3 Rubin, Jennifer. “A timely victory for the rule of law.” The Washington Post. December 11, 2019. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/11/win-rule-law/; Judis, John B. The Populist Explosion. 
(Columbia Global Reports: New York, 2016). pp. 69-71.  
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many others have pointed out, the United States has a history riddled with contradictions. White 
supremacy, Anglo-Saxonism, social and racial Darwinism, and male hegemony have justified 
laws and politics that exclude individuals based on rank, gender, race, sexual orientation, faith or 
class.4 Now, as Governor Mario Cuomo put it in the 1984 Democratic National Convention, the 
country feels less like a “shining city on a hill” and more like a “tale of two cities,” divided and 
polluted.5  
There is, however, cause for hope. The harm that stems from inequalities and a sense of 
powerlessness has propelled vulgar populisms, but it itself provides a window into better 
understanding American politics and the institutions that now seem to be teetering. That 
wounded feeling, as Francis Fukuyama argues in his book Identity, is dignity. Dignity, he argues, 
is tangible. It is part of that “inner self” which demands recognition and a sense of worth through 
political, economic, and cultural or normative institutions.6 This demand for recognition has 
grown since the Enlightenment. In the American context, these “dignity demands” have slowly 
expanded to include both negative rights, such as freedom of speech or religious liberty, and 
positive rights, usually in the form of economic rights like access to housing, clothing, food and 
water, and remunerative work.   
After the election of Donald Trump in the United States, talk of a “dignity deficit” or 
“dignity gaps” blossomed on the left and right. Arthur C. Brooks, president of the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI), contends that Trump’s election was a reaction to dignity deficits in 
 
4 Smith, Rogers M. “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America.” American 
Political Science Review. Vol. 87, No. 3. September 1993. p. 549.; Klein, Ezra. “American democracy has faced 
worse threats than Donald Trump.” Vox. May 10, 2018. https://www.vox.com/2018/5/10/17147338/donald-trump-
illiberal-undemocratic-elections-politics.  
5 Cuomo, Mario. More than Words. (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1994).  
6 Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: 
New York, 2014). p. 37.  
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much of the deindustrialized and impoverished Midwest and Appalachia.7 In the journal 
Democracy, Gene Sperling argues that by allowing licentious market systems to stymie 
opportunity and human flourishing, the federal government has lost view of its very purpose: 
fulfilling “the pursuit of happiness.”8 Sperling and Brooks are not alone in claiming dignity as a 
long-held American value. Americans from many political stripes have claimed the banner of 
dignity. President Ronald Reagan and Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, political 
opposites, both argued that the United States was founded on the idea of human dignity.9 
William Jennings Bryan’s firebrand populism was undergirded by a stalwart belief that social 
Darwinism and monopolies threatened to rob people “of the dignity conferred upon [them] 
by…creation.”10 Lincoln warned that slavery would sunder the “dignity and rights” promised to 
all by the Constitution. In the same speech, he set forth the famous line that would characterize 
dignity ideas: “but let us have faith that Right, Eternal Right makes might, and as we understand 
our duty, so do it!”11 
In the spirit of Lincoln’s call of duty, this thesis argues for the recognition of a less 
examined and theorized tradition in American politics and discourse. That tradition is 
dignitarianism, and this thesis is dedicated to understanding the development and role of dignity 
ideas in American politics and institutions. Special attention will be given to how dignitarian 
ideas emerged in colonial America and the early United States, encompassing a period from the 
 
7 Brooks, Arthur C. “The Dignity Deficit.” Foreign Affairs. March/April 2017. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-13/dignity-deficit.  
8 Sperling, Gene. “Economic Dignity.” Democracy Journal. No. 52, Spring 2019. 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/52/economic-dignity/ 
9 “First Inaugural Address of Ronald Reagan.” January 20, 1981. Avalon Project. 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/reagan1.asp.; Brennan, William J. “Speech given at the Text and Teaching 
Symposium, Georgetown University.” October 12, 1985. PBS. 
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/sources_document7.html.   
10 Bryan, William Jennings. In His Image. (Project Gutenberg EBook Press, 2004). 
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/12744/pg12744-images.html.  
11 Lincoln, Abraham. Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Vol. 4.  
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1700s to the 1830s known in historiography as the “American Enlightenment.” Dignity talk 
flowered in this era, signifying efforts to place the term and its moral significance in the lexicon 
of American political thought. Dignitarianism, in the American context, both supports and 
diverges from the broad political traditions of liberalism and civic republicanism, and contains 
two strands of thought: individual and national, or collective, dignity. These currents emerged 
from different meanings of the term “dignity” and the efforts by founding Americans to instill a 
new national spirit. They established a foundation of dignity conceptions that became an 
enduring contributor to American political development up through today. If we are to better 
understand how dignity and its moral implications influenced the founding of the United States, 
and more so to characterize it as an “ism,” we have to first evaluate the term and its history.  
 
What Is Dignity, Exactly?  
 Dignity ideas have always been part of the American political tradition. That the term 
“dignity” communicates different ideas and seems to mandate diverging policies, however, has 
Figure 1: This graph shows the incidence of the word "dignity" in Google’s Ngram database of English non-fiction sources from 1700 
to 2000. Frequency (percentage of all words used) is located on the y-axis and year on the x-axis.  Source: Google Ngram Viewer. 
Frequency of “Dignity” in English Non-Fiction Works, 1700-2000 
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sparked endless ire amongst academics and commentators. The bioethicist Ruth Macklin argues 
that dignity is “a useless concept” which acts merely as a slogan for religious groups and 
conservatives. Steven Pinker, a Harvard psychologist, likewise claims dignity “is a squishy, 
subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it.” He finds that 
those who frequently employ the term seek to undermine Roe v. Wade or stem cell research.12 
Macklin and Pinker’s hostility to “dignity” does not mean the concept is useless, subjective, or 
harmful. Their rejection of dignity ignores its immensely valuable contribution to the creation of 
modern, egalitarian societies. Like other political values, dignity has relied on interpretation for 
proper illumination. Take “liberty,” for example. Conservatives might deny positive liberties, 
like the right to a job, while left-leaning liberals or social democrats might agree such a right is 
indeed a human right. Dignity is similar. Some promote assisted suicide in the name of “death 
with dignity,” while others, especially Catholics, evangelical Protestants, and social 
conservatives, oppose it in the name of the dignity of human life. Dignity’s occasional ambiguity 
does not detract from its weight even if, admittedly, the word can mean different things.  
Nor does it lessen dignity’s long historical presence, whether the term is explicitly used 
or not. Dignity ideas, for example, widely appeared in the Greco-Roman world, sometimes with 
the label “dignity” and other times without it.13 When the Trojan queen Hecuba is taken slave by 
the Greeks in Euripides’ Hecuba, the chorus weeps for her: “Slavery’s an evil, and will always 
be, human beings brutalised by force.”14 Moral respect isn’t granted to Hecuba the Queen, but to 
the dignity of Hecuba the human being. The Romans are responsible for the etymology of the 
word dignity, the Latin root dignitas, meaning “worth” or “worthy,” and often “honor” or even 
 
12 Pinker, Steven. “The Stupidity of Dignity.” The New Republic. May 28, 2008. 
https://newrepublic.com/article/64674/the-stupidity-dignity. 
13 Debes, Remy. Dignity: A History. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2017). pp. 19-23, 47-56.  
14 Ibid p. 40; Euripides. Hecuba. trans. Harrison. (Faber and Faber: London, 2005).  
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“rank.” Most notably, Cicero argued that duties to others and the self follow from the “dignity of 
the human race” above lesser animals. Since human beings exist at a higher status than the rest of 
other living creatures, thanks to our moral capacity, we have an inherent dignity or worth.15  
Religion has also played a key role in the development of dignity ideas. Judeo-Christian 
theologies consider mankind to have been created B’Tselem elohim, in the “image of God,” or 
imago Dei in the Latin Vulgate Bible, granting humans a unique dignity by placing them above 
the rest of creation.16 However, most of these accounts only analyze “Western” conceptions of 
dignity. The term and its ideas have been widely considered across cultures and geographies. 
Islam, for example, holds that human beings have qīma, an “inalienable worth,” bestowed by 
Allah, and are created with “the finest of constitutions.” Dignity language also makes an 
appearance in Confucian thought. Demeaning treatment is shameful, and individuals have 
responsibilities to prevent such treatment of others and themselves. This duan, literally translated 
as “sprouts,” can be cultivated by all people not just nobility.17 
Trying to define dignity, let alone trace the full history of dignity, is a colossal task. This 
thesis, however, will attempt to offer a working definition informed by the works of 
contemporary scholars: Francis Fukuyama, Michael Rosen, Jeremy Waldron, and Martha 
Nussbaum. Let us first consider these contributions, starting by revisiting Fukuyama’s book 
Identity. He draws wisdom from Plato, the Enlightenment, and positive psychology in theorizing 
about dignity. Dignity is less a metaphysical essence and more a response to human thymos, a 
component of the soul – or human personality – that “craves recognition.” Fukuyama claims that 
this understanding of dignity became a key political project during the Enlightenment, largely 
 
15 Debes, Remy. Dignity: A History. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2017). pp. 50-53.  
16 Rosen, Michael. Dignity: Its History and Meaning. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2012). p. 10. 
17 Debes, Remy. Dignity: A History. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2017). pp. 67-70, 107-109.  
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thanks to the French Revolution and the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and 
Hegel.18 While Fukuyama is right to identify the strength of dignitarian thought in the 
Enlightenment, and its proliferation as a political endeavor, his narrative on its development is 
flawed. He ignores the role that humanism and republicanism, especially in the early 
Renaissance, played in providing an example to future political leaders and thinkers. Fukuyama, 
however, is absolutely right in relegating Immanuel Kant to a lesser role in the development of 
dignity. Modern dignity scholars too often give Kant the recognition of seemingly creating the 
term dignity.19 Instead, Fukuyama gives a rich, comprehensive understanding of how the 
ancients thought of dignity and its connection to virtue, emotion, and egalitarianism.  
The Harvard philosopher Michael Rosen offers a broader view of the history of dignity in 
his work Dignity: Its History and Meaning. For Rosen, “dignity” has historically referred to 
either rank, character, or innate worth.20 Dignity as rank originally most often meant one’s 
position in a divine or natural hierarchy, like the order of angels or in hereditary aristocracies. 
Dignity as character meant morally and aesthetically commendable personal qualities and could 
be communicated as “she upheld herself with dignity and grace.” Dignity as innate worth, 
especially in contemporary human rights and theological parlance, refers to the inviolable rights 
and sacredness of the human person, often identified with human capacities for moral agency 
and flourishing. These strands, however, do not stand alone. The reality of dignity language is 
that all of these conceptualizations have collided in different times to create new understandings 
of who we are and how to govern ourselves and flourish.  
 
18 Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: 
New York, 2014). pp. 37-41.  
19 Debes, Remy. Dignity: A History. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2017). pp. 203-205.  
20 Rosen, Michael. Dignity: Its History and Meaning. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2012).p. 40.  
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Waldron and Nussbaum each focus on one of the strands Rosen identifies. For Waldron, 
that emphasis is on rank. Dignity, he argues, was synonymous with rank or status, especially in 
the Middle Ages and early modern period. Waldron goes even further to deny dignity as a moral 
idea and more as a normative status, due to its social role, arguing against dignity as the “telos of 
human rights.” Its proliferation today, he asserts, is more a matter of the diffusion of “high rank” 
from aristocrats to the everyday person.21 Nussbaum is adamantly opposed to this reading. In her 
most recent book, The Cosmopolitan Tradition, Nussbaum identifies dignity as innate human 
worth, rooted in the Cynic-Stoic tradition of Diogenes the Cynic, Cicero, and Seneca. Dignity is 
granted to those with basic moral capacity and reasoning, is emphatically non-hierarchical, and 
can never be sullied.22 Though compelling in some ways, there are also serious issues with this 
version of dignity, Nussbaum argues. What of human beings with disabilities or children unable 
to make mature, moral judgements? What about non-human animals? And, certainly, does not 
denying a person basic rights violate dignity? Seneca is forceful in his rejection of slavery as a 
status: Immo homo est, “he is a man”; but, he fails to consider the institution of slavery itself.23 
Dignity, Seneca argues, makes a person free whether they are in bondage or not – a dangerous 
ignorance of human wellbeing.  
The definition of “dignity” I use draws on but tempers all of the analyses offered by 
Fukuyama, Rosen, Waldron, and Nussbaum. It is also readily applicable in the light of the 
American Founding era. Here is a working definition of dignity in constructing the American 
tradition of dignitarianism: dignity is the innate worth of every individual, broadly derived from 
what Francis Fukuyama calls “Factor X” (nature, moral capacity, reasoning, emotion, a creator, 
 
21 Waldron, Jeremy. Dignity, Rank, and Rights. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Delivered at the University 
of California, Berkeley. April 21-23, 2009. pp. 211-213.  
22 Nussbaum, Martha. The Cosmopolitan Tradition. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2019). pp. 2-3.  
23 Ibid. pp. 37-38.  
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etc.), and is normatively expressed in politics and institutions in the form of expected 
characteristics (e.g. virtues) and rank, ranging from equal to privileged in egalitarian to 
authoritarian polities. Unequal ranks in societies are justified by discrimination based on class, 
gender, race, faith, characteristics, or some other ascriptive quality, and their accepted 
institutionalization is called rankism.24 Just as important as dignity is “indignity,” which is a 
response to rankism following humiliation or domination. Often, it has been indignation that has 
inspired revolution.  
Hopefully, this definition avoids the severest charges of relativism. It should be easily 
recognizable today, but, still reflects deep historical currents. Broadly, American dignitarianism 
draws influence from six nodes: the Cynic-Stoic tradition, Aristotelian virtue ethics, Christian 
theology, Renaissance humanists, Italian and English republicans, and Enlightenment 
rationalists. Founding Americans were deeply influenced by the dignity-slavery language of the 
Stoics. Many were, however, also convinced of original sin and the failings of humanity 
highlighted by Christian, especially Calvinist, theology. Human goodness and wellbeing is easily 
prone to breakage. This reconfiguration of dignitarianism was also supported by Aristotelian 
virtue ethics, as Nussbaum argues in defense of her Capabilities Approach thesis. The humanism 
of the Renaissance, republicans like John Milton, and the Enlightenment helped reorient the 
moral objective of government towards human flourishing, or eudemonia. This helped remove 
the blindfold that afflicted the Stoics when it came to material conditions. 
Dignity is, thus, the reason for and the tool by which happiness, or flourishing, is 
achieved. Jimmy Carter expressed this bicameral reasoning in his 1977 Inaugural Address: “We 
have already found a high degree of personal liberty, and we are now struggling to enhance 
 
24 For more on “rankism,” please see: Fuller, Robert W. Somebodies and Nobodies: Overcoming the Abuse of Rank. 
(New Society Publishers: Gabriola Island, 2004).  
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equality of opportunity. Our commitment to human rights must be absolute, our laws fair, our 
natural beauty preserved; the powerful must not persecute the weak, and human dignity must be 
enhanced.”25 In light of the above arguments concerning America’s dignitarian heritage, it is not 
surprising that Carter’s dignitarian call to action looks so familiar to the Declaration of 
Independence’s affirmation of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”  
 
Constructing American Dignitarianism 
 The dignitarian tradition, or dignitarianism, emerged from a reconsideration of human 
value, what dignity is and how it applies to peoples in and outside of the political community, 
during the Hellenistic Period and again later in the early Renaissance. Its political influence is 
best seen in considerations of human nature, and how that nature merits certain laws, systems of 
government, and basic treatment by others. Dignitarian thought historically precedes the 
paradigmatic traditions of liberalism as elaborated by John Locke and others, and civic 
republicanism, initially forwarded by Niccolò Machiavelli and then analyzed by J.G.A. Pocock. 
Drawing on these traditions, the United States’ construction of its own dignitarianism – albeit 
shadowed by the ascriptivist specters of racial Darwinism, white supremacy, and female 
subjugation – offered intellectual and political space to operationalize dignity language for both 
the rights of the individual and the “common good.” In short, dignitarianism works with 
liberalism and civic republicanism in allowing for an “individual dignity” and a “national 
dignity.” These elements of dignitarianism most closely align with the traditions oriented 
towards the entity of consideration: individual dignity and liberalism, and national dignity and 
civic republicanism. 
 
25 “Inaugural Address of Jimmy Carter.” The Avalon Project. January 20, 1977. 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/carter.asp.  
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 A dignitarian society cannot exist in a vacuum of extreme individuality or subsumption 
of all individuality by the state. It is equally concerned with the supremacy of the individual and 
the common good. This makes for serious departures with some liberal and republican 
assumptions. Dignitarianism often disputes the utility calculations found in classical economics 
and has qualms with some of the applications of the no-harm principle of John Stuart Mill. Take 
one extreme example: though it might not be considered harmful to others to mistreat a deceased 
body, since the person is dead, a dignitarian would consider it violative of individual dignity and 
damaging to society. Treating a person’s remains with respect not only pays homage to the 
person’s memory and work, but cultivates virtue and respect in the self and amongst members of 
a community. Dignitarianism also cautions against overly communitarian impulses or 
unnecessary intrusions by the state that might occur in civic republican thought, like coerced or 
pressured expressions of loyalty to politicians and the state (e.g. the pledge of allegiance in 
classrooms). In essence, what exactly the “public interest” is must be more carefully considered.  
How, then, can we more aptly define dignitarianism? There is scant literature that grants 
“dignity” the status of being a political philosophic tradition let alone an ideology or doctrine. 
Then again, perhaps there is not a need to classify dignitarianism as an ideology. In his recent 
publication, A Thousand Small Sanities, Adam Gopnik characterized liberalism as both tradition 
and “temperament,” a “way of managing the world more than a fixed set of beliefs.”26 John B. 
Judis likewise argued that populism is not an ideology, “but a political logic – a way of thinking 
about politics” across the left-right political spectrum.27 Dignitarianism must be thought of in 
similar ways. It is fundamentally an assumption about human nature, that we are all equal in rank 
and value with the potential to flourish, if given the opportunity to do so. It is, in essence, a 
 
26 Gopnik, Adam. A Thousand Small Sanities. (Basic Books: New York, 2018). p. 12.  
27 Judis, John B. The Populist Explosion. (Columbia Global Reports: New York, 2016).  pp. 6-7.  
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language of equality. Dignitarianism inherently mandates a “big-tent” logic. It doesn’t 
necessarily matter from where our dignity is derived, but that we all have it.  
This is useful because it places immense value not just on individual contributions, but on 
how to construct a larger, pluralistic society that respects and advances human dignity, making it 
a good tool for nation and coalition-building. Meiji Japan often invoked the “national dignity” in 
its attempts to “modernize” its government, economy, and even aspects of its culture (e.g. 
adopting baseball); Mexico’s leftist president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, has rallied against 
President Trump’s tariff policies in “defense of national dignity.” In a much more coercive 
manner, “national dignity” was invoked by Taiwanese lawmakers in legislation that banned 
Taiwan’s retired officials from engaging in pro-Chinese behavior like saluting the flag or reciting 
the national anthem.28 When invoking “national dignity,” there are often risks of extremism. 
Lebanon’s Samah Idriss, a leader of the Campaign to Boycott Supporters of Israel in Lebanon, 
lobbied for the ban of the 2018 film The Post, portraying it as violative of Lebanon’s “national 
dignity.” Steven Spielberg, who directed The Post, violated Lebanese artistic content laws by 
donating to relief efforts in Israel. Lebanon overturned the ban after public uproar.  
National dignitarianism, however, can be constructive. Rogers Smith’s theory of political 
peoplehood offers insight into how such language can establish institutions that fulfill the 
individual’s demand for recognized worth. For Smith, the construction of political peoples – 
members of a group, community, or polity – is best achieved by persuasive stories based on 
political power, economic, and ethical claims. More broadly, such stories are rooted in trust and 
worth: trust in fellow citizens and leaders to “respect and…advance their own interests, values, 
and identities”, and worth as the members’ belief that the community can “succeed in advancing 
 
28 Huang, Hsin-po and Hsiao Sherry. “’National dignity’ rules passed.” Taipei Times. July 4, 2019. 
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some of one’s important values or interests.”29 What differentiates American dignitarian claims 
to a “national dignity,” versus the example from Lebanon, is an emphasis on both government 
functionality and respect of individual citizens. In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton 
argued that a strong, central government would be “the safest course for your liberty, your 
dignity, and your happiness.” A government that fails to tax, raise armies to protect its citizens, 
accrue credit for public works, or effectuate a foreign policy, compromises the dignity and 
freedoms of its citizens.30 
Individually, American dignitarianism holds that creativity and conscience are 
sacrosanct: the state does not have authority to restrict human ingenuity or autonomy unless it 
harms others or society. This tug-of-war between state and individual was elemental in debates 
during the Founding, and remains so in dignitarian debates. Take, for example, modern bans on 
hate speech. In the United States, speech may only be censored if it readily incites imminent 
violence. In much of Europe and Canada, hate speech is banned for its potential to incite harm 
and its damage to human dignity. During the American Enlightenment, American dignitarianism 
too contended with this battle between these libertarian and regulatory demands.  
Chapter 1 will explore how individual dignitarianism evolved in the colonial United 
States and how this tradition contributed to the development of religious tolerance and liberty, 
freedom of speech, privacy values, and opposition to the death penalty and “cruel and unusual 
punishment.” Chapter 2 of this thesis will analyze American “national dignity.” The Founders 
and Framers were ever concerned with the risk of tyranny arising from the lack of proper 
government. National dignitarianism played a strong role in the formation of a strong federal 
 
29 Smith, Rogers M. Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership. (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2003). pp. 56-60 
30 Hamilton, Alexander; Jay, John; and, Madison, James. The Federalist Papers. (New York: Signet Classic, 2003). 
No. 1. pp. 6, 30-34.  
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government, a new diplomacy, and new ideas of citizenship. Yet, due to the rankisms and 
racisms of the age, “national dignity” all too also often enabled violations of individual dignity 
for citizens and non-citizens alike by curtailing free speech, justifying aggressive expansionism, 
and enabling pernicious institutions like slavery. The conflict between national dignity and 
individual dignity was elemental in the Founding era, and, with the rise of modern populisms and 
right-wing authoritarianism, remains so today. 
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Chapter One 
Liberty, Equality, and Dignity 
 
 
 
 
 America’s dignitarian tradition emerged in a world where “absolute individuals had 
replaced absolute kings and absolute churches.”31 New ideas from humanist, Enlightenment 
rationalist, and Protestant schools of thought were tempered by old experiences of state 
oppression and continuous warfare. The Spanish Inquisition, the Wars of Religion and religious 
persecution, the Thirty Years War, and the English Civil War scarred generations of future 
colonists and created the backdrop for the emergence of liberal political thought during the 
Enlightenment.32 While not uniquely confined to the Enlightenment, dignity talk markedly 
increased in the colonial United States and Europe between 1700 and 1800 due to such historical 
experiences, as well as the transatlantic dissemination of philosophical and religious texts.   
In the colonial United States, the dignitarian tradition’s individualistic strand embraced 
an expansive stance towards the rights of conscience, particularly when dealing with religious 
diversity, but was also tempered by “ordered liberty”: an orientation towards the common good 
and clear and equitable restraints on licentiousness, informed by deep respect for the human 
person.33 Individuals could think what they want, but had no license to impose such a will or 
conduct themselves in ways that would harm others or society. Such thinking preceded John 
 
31 Niebuhr, Richard H. The Kingdom of God in America. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988). p. 100.  
32 Hamilton, Marci. God vs. The Gavel. (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005). pp. 252-259.  
33 Ibid. pp. 260-262. 
Koslowski 18 
 
Stuart Mill’s no-harm rule. Dignitarian progenitors, particularly Roger Williams, a Rhode Island 
minister, and William Penn, the founder of the Pennsylvania colony, drew upon the teachings of 
the popular Stoic philosophers as well as the language of Protestantism in constructing this norm. 
Like the Stoics they argued that every human being had dignity, but like Protestants they worried 
about the crippled state of human souls. Rather than minimize human worth and status, this 
instilled urgency to protect and cultivate human dignity. The emergence of a distinctive 
American dignitarianism began at this time.  
Whereas later British philosophers, such as John Locke, were more ready to accept some 
degree of rankism, a result of discriminations abounding in British society, American thinkers 
like Roger Williams were more hesitant. There was, though, little divergence in theory. In fact, 
many scholars have pointed to Williams as inspiration for Locke’s thinking on religious 
tolerance.34 What rights had once been accorded only to the nobility – property, speech and 
expression, choice of faith, and even life itself – were held to be properly diffused more broadly 
in America and parts of Europe, such as Britain and later France during the 1789 revolution. In 
the United States, individual dignitarian thinking played an outsized role in three domains: 
liberty of conscience, speech, and privacy. American experiences with religious oppression and 
diversity, parliamentary privilege and censorship, and the forceful quartering of troops all shaped 
these developments.  
Though the new United States created the space for these rights to be enjoyed, they were 
obviously not shared equally. Rankism persisted in the form of white supremacy, patriarchy, and 
classism. Dignity was not diffused to all people, just all citizens: white, male property owners, 
or, at best, taxpayers. Yet, if noble rank could be diffused to the citizenry as recognition of 
 
34 Nussbaum, Martha. Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality. (New York: 
Basic Books, 2008). pp. 36, 73.  
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human dignity, how were leading Americans to deal with those considered outside of the 
political community? In dealing with “out” groups, the founding generation generally failed to 
meet dignitarian standards. Slavery persisted in the name of expediency and wealth creation. 
Patriotic rhetoric conferred upon women the status of “Republican motherhood,” offering them a 
role in the country’s new political project.35 Still, women were treated as a separate and unequal 
category of persons. The founders were much more successful in a narrower class of people, 
namely criminals. Much like Enlightenment era philosophers, a great number of founding 
Americans despised cruelty as an affront to the dignity of the human person. Invocations of our 
shared “humanity” were a call to recognize our shared dignity. Founding dignitarians readily 
argued against capital punishment, and advocated banning torture and other “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”36  
 
Characterizing the American Enlightenment 
These new political developments grew out of the Enlightenment, but more broadly out 
of a unique sub-period known as the “American Enlightenment,” ranging from around the 1740s 
to the 1840s. What made the so-called “American Enlightenment” unique amongst the other 
European Enlightenments was the “essential unity” between the American rationalist and 
religious camps despite their doctrinal differences.37 Looking at the most influential Americans 
of this age alone reveals the blurred lines in the rationalist and Protestant camps. Many 
 
35 For more on dignity and “republican motherhood,” please see: Kerber, Linda K. “The Republican Mother: 
Women and the Enlightenment – An American Perspective.” American Quarterly. Vo. 28, No. 2. (Summer 1976).  
pp. 187-205.; and, Zagarri, Rosemarie. “Morals, Manners, and the Republican Mother.” American Quarterly. Vol. 
44, No. 2. (June 1992). pp. 192-215.  
36 See: Bessler, John D. The Birth of American Law: An Italian Philosopher and the American Revolution. (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2014).; and, Adams, John. “Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams.” April 27, 1777. 
Massachusetts Historical Society. https://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17770427ja.;  
37 May, Henry F. The Enlightenment in America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). p. xiii. 
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Americans like Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine detested the clergy, yet often invoked the 
idea of a Creator god and other supposed Judeo-Christian values. The Reverend Jonathan 
Edwards – the famous itinerant preacher of the First Great Awakening of the 1740s – and his 
fellow evangelical Protestants believed revelation often trumped rationalism. Yet, Edwards often 
lauded human creativity and reason as gifts of creation, drawing inspiration from both Locke’s 
“Essay Concerning Human Understanding” and the Bible. More complicated are those like 
James Madison, who was a devout Calvinist but was also firmly committed to reason and self-
governance, in the tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment and republican thought more 
broadly.38 
The American Enlightenment was fundamentally about human nature. The historian D.H. 
Meyer best summarized this interpretation of the American Enlightenment through the example 
of Reverend Charles Backus, a late 18th century New England minister. Backus saw both faith 
and reason as equally key, and often complementary, allies in the development of the “American 
Way.” He believed that for the United States to flourish in “the enlightened age,” Americans 
must cultivate republican virtue through the reconciliation of faith and reason in order to 
“advance the interest and dignity of a free people.”39 For all the conflict between faith and 
reason, Enlightenment rationalism and faith were often comrades in arms in the mission to tear 
down ancient aristocratic status and privileges in colonial America.  
A number of historians and thinkers have corroborated this synthesis. In his seminal 
essay Protestant-Catholic-Jew, the American writer and Jewish theologian Will Herberg 
identified the undeniable core of the “American Way of Life” as the affirmation of the “supreme 
 
38 Ibid. pp. xii-xv.  
39 Meyer, D. H. “The Uniqueness of the American Enlightenment.” American Quarterly. Vol. 28, No. 2. (Summer 
1976). pp. 165-166.  
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value and dignity of the individual.”40 This creed, Herberg argues, was formed by the “paradox-
pervasive secularism and rising religiosity” of the United States. Indeed, individual dignity was a 
constitutive part of the “spiritual values” of American democracy. Further, in line with a more 
liberal aspect to the American dignitarian tradition, this creed constitutes an ethic of “self-
reliance, merit, and character,” emphasizes “deeds, not creeds” and places “amazingly high 
valuation…on [Americans’] own virtue.”41  
Religion is a powerful medium for talking about human nature. The language of 
Protestantism was influential in reshaping what the founding Americans thought of humanity. 
No longer was the honor of being “human” confined to the exceptional few by the time of the 
Revolution. Views of human nature fundamentally shifted from aristocratic to democratic 
assumptions, affirming equal humanity.42 Religion, however, was not the only shaper of these 
modern understandings of being human. As the theologian H. Reinhold Niebuhr observed: “In 
America as in England the Christian enlightenment stood beside the rational enlightenment in the 
battle for democracy.” It should be added that Niebuhr was not convinced of an equal 
partnership: he believed that for every “ten soldiers” Christianity supplied to the cause, 
Enlightenment rationalism “furnished [only] one.”43  
This is debatable. In identifying the dignitarians of the American Enlightenment, one can 
find equal passion amongst secularists and evangelists. Enlightenment philosophers utilized a 
parallel moral language with a “lively melodrama” and an aggressive “partisan militancy.”44 
Thomas Paine, for example, bluntly wrote in American Crisis that his passion came from “a 
 
40 Herberg, William. Protestant-Catholic-Jew. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955). p. 38, 92. 
41 Ibid.  p. 92.  
42 Diamond, Martin. “The American Idea of Equality: The View from the Founding.” The Review of Politics. Vol. 
38, No. 3. (July 1976). pp. 320-321.  
43 Niebuhr, Richard H. The Kingdom of God in America. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988). p. 124. 
44 Meyer, D. H. “The Uniqueness of the American Enlightenment.” American Quarterly. Vol. 28, No. 2. (Summer 
1976). p. 169.  
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fixed, immovable hatred…to cruel men and cruel measures.”45 Nor would it be fair to caricature 
Protestant ministers and revivalists as Bible-thumping anti-rationalists. Edwards shared Backus’ 
goal of reconciling “piety” and “reason,” and sought to “convince the mind rather than to stir the 
emotions” even if his sermons seemed to achieve the opposite.46 Both types of dignitarians 
viewed liberties, from freedom of religion to freedom from torture, to be essential to “liberation 
and human dignity.”47 
 
Dignity and the Natural Rights Tradition 
In his Lectures on Law, James Wilson, a founding father and later Justice of the Supreme 
Court, invoked a close relationship between the newly formed United States and the “ancient 
Saxons.” Wilson, a firm dignitarian, believed that, like in early “Anglo-Saxon state,” the United 
States recognized all to “be of the same rank and condition.” Those with a greater character, 
talent, or background, were given “no legal preeminence or power.”48 Wilson goes to great 
lengths to discount quite a lot of inequality. In so doing, Wilson accurately identifies the goal of 
dignitarianism, if not the reality of American conditions, and more broadly, he sketches an 
intellectual link between British sources and colonial America. 
The first influential body of imported work on American understandings of individual 
dignity came from the British Isles during the late 17th and much of the 18th centuries. This 
period is referred to as the “Moderate Enlightenment” not because of a timid embrace of 
Enlightenment values, but due to attempts to synthesize or balance religious and rational 
 
45 Paine, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Paine, Vol. I. (1774-1779). (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007). 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/paine-the-writings-of-thomas-paine-vol-i-1774-1779.  
46 Niebuhr, Richard H. The Kingdom of God in America. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988). p. 106. 
47 Meyer, D. H. “The Uniqueness of the American Enlightenment.” American Quarterly. Vol. 28, No. 2. (Summer 
1976). p. 170. 
48 Wilson, James. Collected Works of James Wilson, vol. 2. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007). 
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viewpoints forwarded by figures ranging from Isaac Newton to the Archbishop of Canterbury 
John Tillotson.49 Herein we see the confluence of Stoic and Renaissance conceptions of dignity 
with the thought of the Protestant Reformation. This chapter of the Enlightenment embraced 
ideas of human dignity, but Protestant thinkers were quick to emphasize that humans were 
fallible and lived in a flawed world. The solution, however, wasn’t tyranny. Excessive 
constrictions on human way of life could prove existentially burdensome and spur delinquency 
instead of moral rectitude. In this period, then, dignity must be closely associated with the 
blossoming natural rights tradition. Many scholars have contested this relationship or implicitly 
denied their connection. Pauline C. Westerman, for example, asserts that natural rights cannot 
logically rest on human dignity because the latter implies some ill-defined duty to God which 
could harm others.50 A closer analysis of prominent Moderate Enlightenment thinkers – such as 
John Locke and Samuel Clarke – shows that they conceived of a human dignity that acts as a 
spring for natural rights, especially for an ordered liberty.  
The American colonies had an insatiable demand for the literary and philosophical books 
of Enlightenment Britain. John Locke, Isaac Newton, Samuel Clarke, and Alexander Pope were 
beloved additions to American libraries and homes.51 Locke, especially, was influential in 
American political thought. The Founders often invoked his name and works when discussing 
the political matters of the country. What makes Locke a dignity thinker is his “workmanship 
model,” which utilizes the imago Dei language of theologians from Thomas Aquinas to Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola, and provides the linkage between dignity and natural rights. In his Essay 
 
49 May, Henry F. The Enlightenment in America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). pp. 3-9.  
50 Westerman, Pauline C. “Natural Rights versus Human Dignity: Two Conflicting Traditions.” Chapter. In The 
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Concerning Human Nature, Locke is generally hostile to human minds having “innate ideas,” 
but he grants “that if there were any idea to be found imprinted on the minds of men, we have 
reason to expect it should be the notion of his maker, as a mark God set on his own 
workmanship.”52 That is, the “workmanship of understanding” allows human beings to reason: to 
make abstract general ideas, discern and form patterns, discover truths, and act with virtue.53 In 
his Two Treatises on Government, Locke expands on this model, offering that just as God 
imbued human beings with reason, so too did he install “a strong desire of self-preservation,” 
even as he created the “necessaries of life” to aid preservation, such as animals, plants, and 
minerals, for human use and property.54 
If human beings are the workmanship of God, imbued with a drive for self-preservation 
and the ability to use the resources of the Earth, then they are free within moral confines – the 
natural law – to use those gifts. The state of nature may be pre-political, but it is definitely not 
pre-moral. If, once created, the state infringes upon such natural liberties, the result is catastrophe 
for the person. The workmanship model is not a ticket for licentiousness, however. Locke warns 
that though humans are born into liberty, it is not an “uncontrolable [sic] liberty.” We cannot 
“harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possession: for men being all the workmanship of 
one…Maker,” all have rights to life that must be honored.55  Dignity, then, is a divine gift that 
enables human beings’ capacity to reason and follow the natural law, resulting in the natural 
rights to life, liberty, and property, and the moral duties to respect such rights. Locke’s dignity 
focus is primarily on aspects of non-domination. In his Education discourses, Locke advises to 
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condition the body and mind so as to “be disposed to consent to nothing, but what may be 
suitable to the dignity and excellency of a rational creature.”56  
 A number of moderate Protestant ministers like the widely beloved Dr. Samuel Clarke 
were invaluable in the mission of proliferating secular, egalitarian ideas of dignity. The 
American philosopher Charles Gray Shaw commented in his 1911 work Value and the Dignity of 
Human Life that Clarke’s views on dignity both preceded and mirrored Kant’s work almost a 
century later. Clarke argued that dignity is a part of the rational human soul, an “autonomous 
ideal” justifying doing rights for right’s sake as a form of eudaimonia. Dignity demands virtue, 
and to follow it leads to flourishing.57 Clarke’s idea of dignity is thus very similar to Locke’s 
Workmanship Model and only falls back on any sort of rank-based ideas of dignity when 
referring to divine figures like Christ. This is to be expected when considering the multifacility 
of dignity talk. Most important was the use of phrases like “dignity of persons,” not kings or 
nobles.58 Like Locke, Clarke believed that dignity was a gift from God and bestowed human 
beings with unique rationality that allowed them to observe nature and discover, and thus follow, 
the natural law.59  
 Clarke consistently uses dignity to mean inherent value. He even applies it to human 
constructs, like “practical religion,” which esteems the “dignity” of human nature.60 Clarke 
ardently believed in the dignity of every person, so much so that his famous publication A 
Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God – widely read in Britain and the American colonies 
– devotes large swaths of texts to attacking deists who he argues “have no sense at all of the 
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dignity of human nature, nor of the superiority and excellency of their reason.”61 This is not a 
fair characterization, but like Locke, Clarke places a premium on the value of liberty derived 
from human dignity. To abuse the “glorious privilege of liberty by which [humans] are exalted in 
dignity,” is no less than a crime against nature. Even clearer, Clarke holds that people and 
governments have a duty to preserve the “liberty and free-choice, whereby they are exalted in 
dignity.”62  
 
The First Great Awakening and Calvinizing Dignity 
The First Great Awakening emerged from the “refreshing” revivals of New Jersey in the 
1730s, and persisted into the 1750s. It was not merely a “reprisal” of 17th century Protestantism, 
but engaged the American population being shaped by the Enlightenment, creating the spiritual 
undercurrents Herberg identified as constitutive values of American democracy.63 This might be 
surprising considering that the Great Awakenings are popularly caricatured for their raucous 
revivals, and of course, the rowdy preacher with his polemic of fire and brimstone. While much 
of this is true on the surface, these characterizations do a grave disservice to the intellectual 
tradition at the heart of these Awakenings. Three prominent revivalists in particular – the “New 
Light” Congregationalist Jonathan Edwards, and the Methodists George Whitefield and John 
Wesley – contributed to, and helped reinvent, the dignity language of American Protestantism.64 
To understand these developments, it helps to have a reference point. John Flavel, a 
Puritan minister of the 17th century, was a favorite of Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield, 
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the two giants of the Awakening.65 Flavel’s collected works, most notably his Pneumatologia: A 
Treatise on the Soul of Man, would circulate throughout Great Britain and the American colonies 
in the 18th and 19th century and featured remarkable discussions of individual human dignity. 
Flavel sketches out a theological argument for imago Dei, humanity being born in the “image of 
God.” To Flavel dignity came from human beings’ immortal, God-given soul. Human beings 
dignity then holds “glories in two excellencies”: liberty and dominion, or autonomy.66 Liberty 
against compulsion, as respect to the self and others, and enabling virtuous conduct; and, 
dominion or autonomy, over body and emotion, in order to act virtuously. Further, the content of 
each human soul renders us all equal: “The soul of the poorest beggar that cries at the door for a 
crust is…of equal dignity and value of the most glorious monarch that sits upon the throne.”67  
Jonathan Edwards followed in Flavel’s footsteps, popularizing dignity at the pulpit. The 
intellectual heart of the First Awakening, Edwards injected into the mainstream of American 
politics a conception of dignity that emerged from a regenerative experience in the revivals, 
invoking love for God and humanity alike.68 This was not merely a vision of dignity that 
mirrored the ancient Greeks or Romans. Edwards preached that human passions and human 
dependency, on each other and God, were not limiting. Instead, they offered a window into 
understanding humanity’s role as a creation that “partakes of the divine.”69 Further, these 
features of humanity tempered naïvely optimistic ideas of dignity with the reality of humanity’s 
capacity for evil. Human beings were born into dignity and depravity. The Fall had tainted 
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human nature, albeit not enough to justify violating the moral law or each other’s humanity. 
Edwards viewed the work of his fellow revivalists as the work of salvation, culminating in the 
millenarian kingdom of God on Earth. Though he acknowledged human depravity, he dismissed 
pessimism from Calvinism through dignity language: “God’s great design in his works, is 
doubtless his reasonable creations.”70 Dignity, then, is inward “excellency” to Edwards, 
attainable by all through lives of faith and charity.71 Human beings’ inner dignity reflects the 
glory of God through reason and emotion, especially love.   
In his 1755 treatise The Nature of True Virtue, Edwards expands this understanding of 
dignitarian conduct: “the dignity of any being consists in those two things…respect to being,” 
and “a truly virtuous temper.”72 The first, respect to being, is simply defined – if not so simply 
carried out – as respect for fellow human life, as well as for God. Mutual humanity requires just 
treatment. And, though Edwards does not extend this to political debates over rights, it is 
reasonable to see how Americans’ internalization of this argue led to rights claims during the 
Founding. Certainly, human excellence varies wildly. There is true evil in the world. What 
justifies upholding dignity, though, is the universal potential for salvation as a central feature of 
humanity’s innate dignity. It is fascinating, and oddly contradictory, that Edwards should 
construct ideas of dignity in this way. It is certainly not like traditional Calvinism. John Calvin 
and St. Augustine certainly never taught believers in Christ to “glory in Men” as Edwards did.73  
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For Edwards, however, the idea of “universal love” proved too powerful. This universal love was 
strongest in the “highest and primary beauty” of creation, humankind.74 
George Whitefield, an immensely popular British, transatlantic revivalist of the First 
Great Awakening, largely corroborated Edwards account of dignity. Whitefield was widely 
admired, even having a deep friendship with Benjamin Franklin, and attracted thousands to his 
revivals across the colonies. Whitefield preached about the “divine image” that was the “original 
dignity of man.”75 Humanity’s fall from grace marked a fall from “primeval dignity,” leaving the 
“divine image [of humans] so defaced” as to be nearly ruined.76 There is, like with Edwards, 
nonetheless a silver lining. In a letter to a friend, Whitefield marveled, “To what dignity has 
CHRIST [sic] exalted human nature. And how did he do it? Why, by humbling himself. Let us 
go and do likewise.”77 To realize  “the Dignity and Worth of [our] immortal Souls,” humans must 
act with like virtue.78  
 John Wesley, another British revivalist in the Awakening, frequently dissented from the 
hardline Calvinistic doctrines of Edwards and Whitefield. Wesley, however, agreed with 
Edwards and Whitefield on humanity’s dual dignity and complicity in original sin. Wesley did 
not travel to America as frequently as Whitefield, but his few trips made lasting impressions. His 
one 1735 journey to the colonies proved especially influential for his rousing of the “lower 
classes” in the highly stratified Georgia society, laying the groundwork for the First Great 
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Awakening.79 More prolific were his printed sermons and treatises, which greatly contributed to 
the literature of the American Methodist Church during the Revolution and the Second Great 
Awakening later in the 1790s. The dignity of human nature was one of Wesley’s primary 
concerns. He was afraid that secular rationalists had abused the term “dignity,” bemoaning “How 
many laboured panegyrics do we now read and hear on the dignity of human nature!” Do not 
confuse this, however, for hatred for the term. Wesley asserted that “In the image of God man 
was made. Hence, we are enabled to give a clear, satisfactory account of….the dignity of man.”80 
Sin of course complicates the matter. In short, being human implies a “baseness,” but humanity 
still contains a “nobleness”: that divine “treasure in earthen vessels” that is dignity.81 With 
dignity comes liberty, “a power of choosing what was good, and refusing what was not so.”82 
Liberty is a “distinct property of the soul,” and it demands “self-determination” and “freedom of 
choice.”83 Certainly, permissive freedoms can lead to danger and corrode the public good. More 
dangerous, however, is a lack of liberty which inevitably leads to slavery, domination, and 
destitution. 
The selected works above do not cover all the wide uses of dignity talk – some instances 
of dignity still refer to rank, though mostly in the case of divine beings –  but, they do make up 
its most serious considerations.  The First Great Awakening offered a refreshing take on ideas of 
human dignity, and aided in forging a broad consensus that all people were born with dignity, 
along with depravity. Whitefield, Wesley, and Edwards viewed dignity as innate and coupled 
with the human depravity that fomented, and now results from, original sin.  
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After the Awakening’s end, the continent was thrust into a more fractured religious 
landscape than before 1740. The immediate theological successors to Jonathan Edwards, dubbed 
proponents of the “New Divinity,” dominated Boston and grew in popularity until the Second 
Great Awakening. These New Divinity preachers adapted the faith to become a vehicle for 
rationalism. This was largely due to the influence of select moderate Enlightenment works, like 
Locke, and the borderline pantheistic metaphysics of Edwards, which itself was partly influenced 
by Locke and others’ views on nature as the workmanship of God. The result was a potent tool 
for dignity language, utilized by the gentlest and fiercest of New Divinity ministers. Samuel 
Hopkins, a temperate Connecticut minister, was one of the fiercest critics of the Newport slave 
trade.84 Nathaniel Emmons, who believed that the saved in Heaven should relish in the suffering 
of the damned, professed the “dignity of man” in a sermon inscribed to Benjamin Franklin, the 
American “patron of science.”85 
 New Divinity was by no means the popular theology of choice. While they had won the 
“intellectual victory,” they were opposed by Arminian, or liberal Protestant, sects and the Old 
Calvinists who pledged a more ready allegiance to the moderate Enlightenment than to the New 
Divinity or Edwards. Although little source work identifies dignity language with the liberal 
Protestant sects of New England and the mid-Atlantic, Old Calvinists certainly carried on the 
tradition, especially in American colleges and seminaries.86 Even Princeton president John 
Witherspoon, who was scathingly critical of humans “apt to boast of the dignity of their nature,” 
admitted that people do “have a right to insist upon such things as belong to the dignity of human 
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nature.”87 This includes “common rights” from respecting the bodies of the dead to advancing a 
government committed to liberty. Witherspoon also placed humanity’s “[superiority] in dignity 
to the other animals” as uniquely able to advance a “public good” thanks to its “exalted and 
rational nature.”88 Ezra Stiles, another Old Calvinist, took a more jubilant approach to human 
nature. At the Revolutionary War’s end, he declared that the United States would become an 
empire of natural religion, “pure and sublime,” with happiness the right end of the constructed 
government, a testament to the “dignity of man” born “in the image of God.”89 
 
The American Dignity Revolution 
 The American Revolution was a resounding call to honor individual dignity. Samuel 
Adams, John Adams’ firebrand cousin, aptly characterized Americans’ indignities at the hands of 
Great Britain. No longer considered equal citizens, Americans had to reassert themselves as “co-
equal in dignity and freedom.”90 These claims to liberty and equality were justified with 
assumptions of the “dignity of human nature.” Magazines and newspapers played a powerful role 
in disseminating these dignity claims, especially The Royal American Magazine in Boston and 
The Pennsylvania Magazine in Philadelphia. The Royal American, for example, published a 
letter on an idealized “American Patriot” who embodies the “dignity of man” through his “ardent 
efforts” to secure the “happiness of mankind” and rejection of aristocratic titles.91 John 
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Witherspoon took the pseudonym “The Druid” when he examined the “dignity of human nature” 
in issues for the Pennsylvania Magazine.92 Students likewise participated in public discourse on 
these dignity claims. One student speaker at Princeton, Witherspoon’s domain, argued that 
liberty, natural and civil, “[rests] upon the dignity of human nature” as its “foundation.”93  
 The wide embrace of this phraseology – “the dignity of human nature” – marks the most 
direct politicization of dignity language in colonial America. The rights once reserved for the 
monarch or the noble became the domain of the individual. If liberty and equality were building 
blocks for the new American political system, then dignity was the underlying cement that 
helped construct a plethora of fundamental rights: liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, right 
to privacy, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. The atmosphere was electric with 
egalitarian dreams. At the eve of the Revolution, as John Adams wrote to Richard Henry Lee, 
Americans saw a chance for a new, virtuous government through which “human nature…[could 
assert] its real dignity, pulling down tyrannies at a single exertion.”94  
 
Liberty of Conscience 
 One of the most attended-to rights in the American dignitarian tradition was that of the 
liberty of conscience, which include freedom of religion (to believe in what one thinks) and 
freedom of observance (to freely worship in gatherings and congregations). The 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia had established the principle of cuius regio eius religio, “whoever’s religion it is, his 
[the ruler] shall the religion be,” in European polities. Tyrants in German principalities, in 
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France, and even in Britain, exerted strict and often violent control over religious activities. The 
same went for the early colonial United States. Religious refugees in Puritan New England often 
inflicted on its inhabitants the same injustices they suffered in England.95 Dignity language, for 
its part, helped in overturning notions of sovereign authority by devolving rank-based authority 
to the citizenry. With individual citizens as sovereigns, liberties of conscience once afforded to 
the sovereign domain were granted to them. Roger Williams and William Penn provided the 
earliest American dignitarian rationales for this argument. 
 Roger Williams, a dissident Puritan minister and Rhode Island colonist who founded the 
First Baptist Church in America, was the earliest proponent of this conception. Writing in the 
1630s and early 1640s, Williams understood the fragility of the human psyche in its yearning for 
recognition and growth. If tyrants imposed a state religion or ideology, the violation on 
individual dignity would be intolerable, an oppression Williams called “Soule rape.”96 He held 
that all people ought to enjoy the “libertie of conscience,” from “Papists” to “the most paganish, 
Jewish, Turkish, or antichristian.” Such “Conscience is found in all mankinde,” and merits equal 
respect and consideration. This conscience, definitionally the dignity of persons, ought not be 
abridged either by direct persecution or by state impartiality.97  
Like Williams, William Penn believed in an equal liberty of conscience for all. His 
reasoning, however, was more concerned with rank and status than Williams. Penn claims that 
all are due the “Honour of our Creation,” and that status includes “those excellent Gifts of 
Understanding, Reason, Judgement, and Faith,” generating an “indispensable Duty,” to the 
dictates of our consciences and thus to the divine. Should government invade this duty with fixed 
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doctrine or principles, these mandates would violate divine will and, more in line with dignity 
language, “the priviledge [sic] of Nature,” and “the Principles of common Reason.” Conscience 
is the fruit of creation and is “Divine Property,” so human beings cannot own other human 
beings, or their faiths and futures.98 
 Penn certainly prophesied Locke’s theory of workmanship. Locke, like Penn, argued that 
“[since] God is the true proprietor” human beings “cannot belong to one another.”99 One’s 
opinions and beliefs are sacred in one’s personal quest for a life of happiness, virtue and 
salvation. When others demand exact conversion to their specific beliefs, such oppression drives 
the individual “to expire in torments.” The only appropriate method of evangelization is “faith 
only, and inward sincerity….that procure acceptance with God.” What follows is a policy of 
toleration toward various churches, where the business of the assemblies are the “salvation of 
their souls,” and of both lawful public worship. “The magistrate” has no rightful power to 
enforce the use of any specific religious rites nor compel church attendance. No amount of rank, 
of “dignity and excellency,” can be granted to an authority to curb such natural liberties.100  
Founding Americans readily affirmed these dignitarian arguments, but many diverged 
from the temperaments and policies of Williams, Penn, and Locke. In his Dissertation on the 
Canon and Feudal Law, John Adams ecstatically called for the pulpits to “resound with the 
doctrines and sentiments of religious liberty…Let us hear the dignity of [man’s] nature, and the 
noble rank he holds among the works of God!” Yet, Adams also praised the 1780 Massachusetts 
Constitution’s provision for “the most mild and equitable establishment of religion,” which 
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showed preference for Christian norms and behavior. Evidently, Adams detested clerical 
tyranny. He believed Massachusetts’ Constitution avoided the “monkery [sic] of priests” (a put 
down of Roman Catholicism) and applied those principles in his Dissertation for all religions. 
Still, Adams’ view of a “Publick religion” was eventually overruled by those in favor of 
disestablishment.101 
One of the most vocal proponents of which was Thomas Jefferson. In almost every 
regard, except for race and gender, Jefferson abhorred rankism. In his Observations for an article 
in Diderot’s Encyclopédie, he expressed “a due horror for the evils which flow from these 
distinctions in Europe only, where the dignity of man is lost in arbitrary distinctions, where the 
human species is classed into several stages of degradation, where the many are crushed under 
the weight of the few.”102 He applied like reasoning for religious liberty: governments must 
apply equal and impartial treatment to all religious sects. In his 1776 Notes on Religion, 
Jefferson elaborates on this thinking, offering that “Nothing but free argument, raillery & even 
ridicule will preserve the purity of religion.” Toleration’s end is humanity’s end, in that “the care 
of every man’s soul belongs to himself” and even in civil society, no “man has right to abandon 
care of his salvation to another.” Where religion was to threaten the public good, however, 
government could reasonably step in and regulate conduct.103 
In 1779, Jefferson set out to formulate a bill that erected a wall between church and state. 
Later, his 1787 Notes on the State of Virginia acknowledged his efforts emulated Pennsylvania 
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and New York in their separation of church and state 104 The outset of the bill revealed 
Jefferson’s commitment to the idea of Penn’s “Divine Property” and Locke’s workmanship 
models. Jefferson contends “that Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his 
supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of restraint.” Our will 
is not our own, and so, “attempts to influence it by temporal punishments…[is a] departure from 
the plan of the holy author of our religion… lord of both body and mind [added for 
emphasis].”105 To otherwise allow the state to indicate preference for a faith is utterly violative of 
human dignity. 
This bill was written with the help of George Mason, another leading proponent of 
religious liberties and dignitarian. Mason, like Jefferson, ardently believed in some quality that 
made humanity dignified. In one 1773 essay, he criticized the “slow poison” of slavery, which 
“taught [us] to regard a part of our own species in the most abject and contemptible degree below 
us.” Once we countenance such an institution, “we lose that idea of dignity of man which the 
hand of nature has implanted in us.”106 Though Mason condemned slavery, he never moved to 
destroy it. His dignity thinking, like Jefferson, shone in practice with rights of conscience. Mason 
penned Virginia’s 1776 Declaration of Rights which held that “religion…and the manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only be reason and conviction,” and that only one’s “dictates of 
conscience” should influence its exercise.107  
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In that spirit, Mason supported legislation in conformity to the Virginia Bill of Rights. He 
helped pen acts suspending government salaries of the clergy, finally abolishing the practice by 
1779. In that same year, he revised Jefferson’s draft of an “Act Establishing Religious Freedom,” 
adding further emphasis to the “tyranny” of forced religious observance.108 With Mason’s aid, 
the legislation was promulgated in 1785. Mason’s efforts on the Virginia Bill of Rights and 
related religious liberty legislation sparked colonies-wide adoptions of bills containing almost 
identical language. Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights, made weeks after Virginia’s, for 
example, declared that “all men have a natural, and unalienable right, to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own conscience.”109 Every state, well before the adoption of the 
U.S. Bill of Rights, had adopted rights of conscience in solidarity.110 Mason’s efforts cannot be 
understated. Though he is no longer well known nationally, one eulogy by Theodorick Bland 
reminds us of Mason’s commitment to dignity and its revolutionary promise: “Mason’s man 
seems to stand erect in all the majesty of his nature, to assert the inalienable rights and equality 
with which he has been endowed by his Creator.”111 
  
Freedom of Speech  
 Here, we must look to rankism and unique privileges in order to trace the dignitarian 
arguments for free speech. Before the Revolutionary War, colonial charters mentioned freedom 
of speech only in the context of the rights of legislators. Individual free speech was largely 
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ignored by the early state constitutions and declarations. The 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights 
was the first document in colonial America to offer protections for speech, but even then, only 
for the press. The only state constitution with a clear protection of freedom of speech, before the 
Articles of Confederation, was Pennsylvania’s. In Article XII, the 1776 Pennsylvania 
Constitution declares “that the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and 
publishing their sentiments.” Only Pennsylvanian law seemed to justify broader speech 
protections based upon the value of individual natural rights.112  
 Elected officials on the floor of their respective legislative buildings, however, could 
argue relatively freely in order to properly represent their constituents. Parliamentary privilege, 
though heavily restricted, was won by the British parliament from Elizabeth I and her Stuart 
successors. It was only with the 1689 Bill of Rights, and its Article 9 protections of “freedom of 
speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament,” that some semblance of individual speech 
protections were codified. Still, the privilege only existed for a lucky few who represented a 
vaster ocean of citizens.113 And, the colonial United States largely followed this tradition of 
limited speech. The Articles of Confederation, and almost all other state constitutions, only 
promised “Freedom of speech and debate in Congress.”114  
 Few early sources promoted a more liberal speech approach to founding Americans. 
Cato’s Letters of 1721-1723, widely read in the colonies, offered the strongest dignitarian 
reasoning for universal free speech. Written anonymously by Thomas Gordon and John 
Trenchard, the letters show clear Lockean influence. Letter No. 15, by Gordon, argues that there 
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can be no such thing as “publick liberty, without freedom of speech.” Speech is the “right of 
every man” just as much as liberty of conscience. Perhaps influencing the prose of George 
Mason, Gordon advanced that “freedom of speech is the great bulwark of liberty.” Suppressing 
this right suppresses human nature and dignity: it “[usurps] the place of equality, which is the 
soul of liberty… and [degenerates minds] into all the vileness and methods of servitude.”115 The 
dignitarian language of liberation and slavery is at full kilt in Gordon’s exhortations. To give into 
tyrants is to “terrify the human soul, degrades its dignity….and to make mankind…the tame 
slaves of raging tyrants.”116 
 Free speech as a limited privilege was incompatible with the Revolutionary experience 
and denied citizens equal dignity, at least on paper. The political environment of the 
Constitutional Convention and Bill of Rights debates was awash with free speech and 
publications on what the next American government should look like. Still, the drafters of the 
Constitution debated whether the enumeration of rights, let alone freedom of speech, should be 
included. Even some of the states who supported a Bill of Rights omitted freedom of speech, 
though not that of the press, in their offered convention amendments, such as New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, and New York.117 Yet, just as representation was about “co-equal dignity,” as 
Samuel Adams said, so too was the methods by which representation was made possible. At the 
Constitutional Convention, James Wilson, a future Supreme Court Justice, invoked the 
sovereignty of the people “at this moment, [while we] speak and deliberate under their 
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immediate and benign influence.” Later in the debates over the Bill of Rights, individuals from 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist factions largely agreed on the substance of free speech and press, 
offering a number of amendments that protected “the freedom of speech, and of the press, and 
the right of the people to peaceably assemble and consult for their common good.”118  
As Akhil Reed Amar has argued, “the First Amendment is indeed simply a textual 
recognition of the structural truth of American popular sovereignty” that was informed by a “rich 
tradition…of guaranteeing absolute freedom of speech and debate within the sovereign 
legislature.”119 Prevailing ideas aided this transition from assumed privilege to protected right. 
Still, freedom of speech faced troubles after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. The most 
perilous challenges came from President Adams’ 1798 Sedition Act which threatened 
punishment against those “write, print, utter [emphasis added] or publish, or shall cause or 
procure [the same], or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid [in the same]…with intent to 
defame the said government…into contempt or disrepute.”120 The scope of the law is 
breathtaking. What’s worse is that it prohibited criticism of incumbents but allowed it against 
challengers. The Sedition Act, in effect, had reestablished exclusive parliamentary debate 
privileges.  
James Madison, George Hay, and Thomas Jefferson rose against the law with a righteous, 
dignitarian fury. Madison was quick to pen a resolution from the Virginia General Assembly 
condemning the act, and warning that, by ignoring popular sovereignty, the United States would 
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soon fall into an “absolute, or, at best, a mixed monarchy.”121 He later made an address to the 
General Assembly where he made the dignity implications even clearer. By restricting free 
speech, the “free range of the human mind is injuriously restrained.” A “double sacrilege” is 
committed since “the sacred obligations of religion flow from the due exercise of opinion.” 
Madison also made rankism connections. The act, in effect, destroys public accountability “thus 
retrograding towards the exploded doctrine ‘that the administrators…are the masters.’”122 
George Hay, a U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, and relatively 
unknown jurist, played an outsized role with his Essay on the Liberty of the Press. In the United 
States, Hays argues, de facto freedom of speech and the press had already been established. State 
and national governments made no laws to “control” the press, nor any distinction made 
“between the freedom and licentiousness of the press,” as opposed to Britain. Why did British 
government do this, while the United States had not? “Where privilege and monopoly form the 
basis of government [in Britain],” Hay advances, “in the United States, it is disgraceful.” Only 
aristocratic ministers seek to “act and punish…without subjecting himself to the odium of having 
transgressed the law.” This distinction between aristocratic privilege and democratic rights is 
seen again in the extension of parliamentary privilege to the citizenry, Hay points out. If freedom 
of speech is a natural freedom – or, natural right – then, in the United States, that privilege which 
enables members of the U.S. House or Senate to debate freely must be granted to all.123  
Thomas Jefferson, likewise, takes an anti-rankism approach in his criticism. In a letter to 
Edmund Randolph, Jefferson goes so far as to lump the Sedition Act with other Federalist 
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objectives in violating popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty is a force that “makes the law 
obligatory; it is their will which creates or annihilates the organ which is to declare & announce 
it.” Laws can indeed be made “by a single person, as an Emperor of Russia…or by a few 
persons, as the Aristocracy of Venice,” but in the United States the “old national will” has 
continued in the form of common law protections for states.124 Jefferson was so fraught over the 
matter he even claimed that, should Americans allow this bill to exist, they would soon declare 
“that the President shall continue in office during life…[with] succession to his heirs.” Certainly, 
he contests, the reestablishment of the aristocracy is an aim of the “Oliverians,” the 
Federalists.125 
 These collective efforts soured public opinion on the Sedition Act, and helped propel 
Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans to victory in the election of 1800. President 
Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address wasted no time in attributing his victory to that of a popular 
revolt against the Sedition Act. “During the contest of opinion,” Jefferson began, “[we have] 
sometimes worn an aspect which might impose on strangers unused to think freely and to speak 
and to write what they think.” In calling for unity, he reminded that “we have yet gained little if 
we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody 
persecutions.” And, should the nation “wander” from such liberties as “freedom of the press,” let 
it use the ballot box  “to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.”126  
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Privacy and the “Sanctity of Home” 
Where direct invocations of “dignity” were absent, Americans often complained of the 
“indignities” thrust upon them by the British crown. In the realm of privacy, unreasonable search 
and seizure perpetrated by general writs of assistance, and the quartering of soldiers were all 
hated practices. So much so that these dehumanizing experiences informed what could 
reasonably be called privacy values. Though the founding documents do not refer to an explicit 
privacy right, certainly the Bill of Rights provides provisions against arbitrary interference. The 
3rd Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers without consent or unless during a time of 
war, the 4th Amendment affirms the “right of the people to be secure in their persons [emphasis 
added], houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the 5th 
Amendment provides against self-incrimination. Privacy is intimately linked to dignity, and in 
like manner to issues of conscience or speech. It is concerned with human flourishing and self-
determination – even “personhood” itself. Further, privacy is an issue of worth, respect and rank, 
as Albert M. Bendich argues: if we are to be free, we “must not be treated as servants…not 
suppliants, and not beggars; but indeed rulers and choosers.”127  
These privacy claims were linked to dignitarian arguments by the efforts of Advocate-
General James Otis to denounce general writs. In effect, the writs allowed universal search and 
seizure upon suspicion of the violation of colonial laws. And, colonial Americans had to suffer 
the indignities of frequent “promiscuous searches.” As the historian William Cuddihy points out, 
most of the colonial search warrants allowed for “a general privy Search.” In the 1749 Conductor 
case, for example, the crime of a stolen sheep apparently merited the “[diligent] search [of] every 
suspected House and Place within your Parish, which you and the…[owner of the sheep] shall 
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think convenient to search.”128 What made these unreasonable searches so malicious was the 
search itself, not just their ridiculous scope. Founding Americans were afraid that invasions of 
privacy were akin to violations of conscience, and therefore dignity. During the debate over the 
Fourth Amendment, for example, Patrick Henry feared such searches could enable the state to 
peer into our “most discreet recesses”; others, our “private papers” or “private concerns.”129  
By the 1760s, such sentiments began to prevail. Starting in 1755, Governor Shirley of 
Massachusetts authorized writs of assistance to curtail smuggling. One customs officer, Charles 
Paxton, received a writ that allowed home searches without citing illegal acts as justification. In 
response, the “Society for Promoting Trade and Commerce Within the Province” brought a case 
against the writs before the Superior Court in the winter of 1761.130 As the Society’s Counselor, 
James Otis took the opportunity of public court to give one of the most stirring pre-
Revolutionary orations for equal rights and dignity. General writs, Otis argued, were “the worst 
instrument of arbitrary power.” They empowered even the lowliest of officers to be a “tyrant,” 
forcing the average person “to be the servants of servants, the most despicable of God’s 
creation.” Quite a demotion from the “dignity of human nature” Otis imagined humanity 
holding. It was by this dignity, an authorship by “his Maker, in the constitution of his nature and 
the inspiration of his understanding and his conscience” that Otis asserted a right to privacy as a 
natural right.131 The home is, indeed, given exalted status: “A man’s house is his castle; and 
whilst he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.”132 When the sacrosanctity of 
the domicile was violated, Americans were uproarious. 
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The forced quartering of soldiers was another such grave “indignity.” Akin to 
unreasonable searches and seizures, quartering violated the sanctity of the home, and therefore, 
individuals. Indeed, most American colonists described the conduct of British troops as 
“licentious and outrageous.”133 In the midst of the French and Indian War, British soldiers 
forcibly seized colonial homes, despite the Mutiny Act preventing such nonconsensual action. 
Parliament’s 1765 Quartering Act did little to improve matters. While it exempted the seizure of 
private homes, it still required Americans to provide housing for soldiers even during times of 
peace. Such furnishing included barracks, inns, public homes, barns, or any structure that could 
house soldiers. Colonists, along with suffering the indemnities of taxes paying for billeting, had 
to provide food, drink, and other necessities. Worse yet, was the suppressive feeling of 
entertaining large standing armies. Colonists lived at the bayonet point, fearing that any 
independent political or legal action might result in violence. Samuel Adams worried the 
occupying soldiers, “may sooner or later begin to look upon themselves as the LORDS and not 
the SERVANTS of the people: instead of enforcing the law…they may refuse to obey it 
themselves.” It is little surprise then that when George Washington’s army liberated Boston, the 
contemporary historian David Ramsay wrote he had released its inhabitants from the “various 
indignities” they suffered from “garrison life.”134  
   
The Death Penalty and “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” 
 The previous three dignity developments concerned themselves with attributes or 
possessions of the person. Another dignitarian movement, and perhaps the most shocking to 
 
133 Fields, William S. and Hardy, David T. “The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Maintenance of Standing 
Armies: A Legal History.” The American Journal of Legal History. Vol. 35, No. 4. (Oct. 1991). pp. 393-431.  
134 Ramsay, David. The History of the American Revolution. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1990). Vol. 1. 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ramsay-the-history-of-the-american-revolution-vol-1.  
Koslowski 47 
 
modern readers, was the founders’ recalcitrance to torture and capital punishment. This is an 
example of how dignity ideas influenced treatment of the human body itself, rather than 
metaphysical appendages like conscience. At the time of the Revolution, British law followed 
what was called the “Bloody Code.” This code prescribed the death penalty for most felony 
crimes, and drew enormous, “often unruly” crowds to public squares to watch the executions. 
Often after the executions, too, further punishment was inflicted on the “criminal corpse.” In 
1752, Britain’s Parliament passed the Murder Act which inflicted hanging in chains or dissection 
on the body. 135 Also common, both in Britain and the colonies, were burning prisoners alive or 
displaying severed hands, heads and slaves’ quarters (i.e. legs) in town squares. So gruesome and 
frequent were these punishments that at times Britain would transport excess prisoners to the 
colonial United States to be executed. 136 
The gross indignities of these inhumane punishments prompted movement in the United 
States towards a focus on a system of rehabilitation. This movement was assisted by the writings 
of the Italian philosopher and criminologist Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria’s On Crime and 
Punishments was widely read in the American colonies – John Adams even gave copies of the 
book as gifts to his sons.137 Beccaria was a student of Francis Bacon, who lauded the “dignity of 
man” in being able to liberate oneself with knowledge, reflection, and education. In that spirit, 
Beccaria envisioned a criminal justice system that embodied humanity trying to free itself from 
poor habit and evil deeds. Punishment, to Beccaria, ought not to “torment and afflict a sentient 
being, nor to undo a crime already committed.”138 Nor should punishments be a mere instrument 
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of the state to enforce obedience to unjust laws.139 In this vein, Beccaria forcefully argued 
against torture and the death penalty. He believed that should he “demonstrate that the death 
penalty is neither useful nor necessary,” he would win “the cause of humanity.”140 Progress made 
with capital punishment and the approval of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual punishment” were reflections of Beccaria’s dignitarian principles. 
The founders, like Beccaria, shared his contempt for torture. Before the Bill of Rights 
was ratified, most state constitutions – barring New Jersey, Georgia, and North Carolina – 
already contained provisions against “cruel” and, or, “unusual punishments” often with torture in 
mind. Even during the Revolutionary War, Americans had pursued what John Adams called a 
“policy of humanity.”141 George Washington notably refused to torture prisoners of war during 
the Revolution and, in a letter to Major-General Schuyler, exhorted him to “recommend to the 
officers and soldiers in the strongest terms to treat all the inhabitants, Canadians, English, and 
savages, with tenderness and respect.”142 Anti-Federalists, however, were not convinced that the 
federal government would act with such restraint in the future. They were still well aware of the 
horrifying practices of the “Inquisitions,” and so to avoid the practices of “France, Spain, and 
Germany,” moved to include the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.143 And, during 
the debates, it was clear that such a prohibition included torture. When responding to a Federalist 
opponent on torture, George Mason argued that explicit protections against torture were 
necessary: “Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments 
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shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition.”144 To violate such a 
prohibition, was to infringe on individual dignity.  
Though most founders opposed torture, they were ambivalent on the death penalty. Most 
importantly, however, many of those who did support the death penalty did so with discomfort 
and preferred moderation, as in the case of George Washington, Charles Pickney, and Alexander 
Hamilton. Washington, for example, often pardoned soldiers and capital offenders. He even used 
his seventh State of the Union address to express his disdain for executions, an excess of which 
could harm “national justice, dignity, and safety [of the public].”145 Opponents of the death 
penalty were fewer in number but extraordinarily effective in their cause. Though even enemies 
of execution believed it could be permitted in extreme cases, they certainly entertained its total 
abolition, as in the case of James Madison. Others who supported reform include those like Dr. 
Benjamin Rush, James Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and John Jay.146  
Of all the death penalty’s opponents, Dr. Benjamin Rush of Philadelphia was the most 
vocal. In his “Considerations of the Injustice and Impolicy of Punishing Murder by Death,” an 
article circulated in Philadelphia’s American Museum magazine, Dr. Rush despaired of the 
persisting death penalty in the United States. He implored Americans to see the “importance and 
destiny of every human soul,” and once seen, Americans would “acquire new ideas of the dignity 
of human nature, and of the infinite value of every act of benevolence that has for its object, the 
bodies, the souls, and the lives of our fellow-creatures.”147 And, as a native Pennsylvanian, Dr. 
 
144 Edited by Cogan, Neil H. et al. The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015). p. 928.   
145 Washington, George. “December 8, 1795: Seventh Annual Message to Congress.” University of Virginia Miller 
Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-8-1795-seventh-annual-message-
congress.   
146 Bessler, John. “The Italian Enlightenment and the American Revolution: Cesare Beccaria’s Forgotten Influence 
on American Law.” Journal of Public Law and Policy. Vol. 37, Issue 1. (2016). pp. 23, 31. 
147 Rush, Benjamin. “Considerations on the Injustice and Impolicy of Punishing Murder by Death.” The American 
Museum. https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=evans;idno=N19031.0001.001.  
Koslowski 50 
 
Rush effectively lobbied the Pennsylvanian legislature with such reasoning. His appeals largely 
contributed to the passage of a 1794 reform bill that restricted the death penalty to first-degree 
murder. He also worked beyond the state’s borders, organizing death penalty abolition efforts in 
New York and Louisiana, helping curtail the practice in both.148   
A number of American Supreme Court Justices generally opposed the death penalty, at 
least its frequent application. James Wilson, a future Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 
asserted in his third Lectures on Law that “life, and whatever is necessary for the safety of life, 
are the natural rights of man.” It is the duty, and often an anxious one, of “legal systems [to] 
spare and preserve human life.” The legal systems of Sparta, Athens, China, Rome, and Indian 
kingdoms, to Wilson, flagrantly treat humans as “mere things[s],” like “cattle.” He even went so 
far as to claim that American common law, “with consistency, beautiful and undeviating, 
[protects] human life, from its commencement to its close.”149 Though he was wrong regarding 
the common law’s application of this value to capital punishment, he demonstrated commitment 
to its opposition throughout his judicial career. In one grandy jury charge, Wilson claimed “that 
capital punishments are, in no case necessary,” later describing such “sanguinary laws” as a 
dangerous “political mistemper.”150 John Jay, America’s first Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, shared Wilson’s distaste for executions, especially brutal ones like “racks, embowelling, 
drawing, quartering, burning, and the like.”151 To Jay, these were “inhuman” practices. Though 
he would support executions for the most serious of offenses, particularly murder, his efforts at 
 
148 Bessler, John D. “Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition 
Movement.” Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy. Volume 4, Issue 2. 2009. pp. 209-213, 232-233.  
149 Wilson, James. Collected Works of James Wilson. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007). Vol. 2. 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/wilson-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-2.  
150 Ibid. Vol. 1. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/wilson-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-1.   
151 Jay, John. The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890-93). Vol. 
3. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jay-the-correspondence-and-public-papers-of-john-jay-vol-3-1782-1793.  
Koslowski 51 
 
reform included helping construct New York’s first penitentiary to alleviate the suffering of 
those waiting for death in confinement pens.152  
Thomas Jefferson was also generally hostile to the death penalty. In a letter to Dr. Rush, 
he believed that executions only lessened “the horror of taking away human life,” and actually 
“[multiplied] murders.”153 He practiced his belief of an unalienable right to life with multiple 
penal reform attempts in Virginia. Drafts of his reforms excluded the death penalty for all crimes 
except murder and in the military, even declaring that states “have no power to pass any law 
inflicting death for any crime, [except for the above cases].” In the same bill he opposed “torture 
in any case whatsoever.”154  Though the same bills included grotesque punishments for crimes 
like rape or sodomy – e.g. castration, boring of holes through nose cartilage – they were 
considered progress as the death penalty had been removed from such crimes. As in the case of 
Pennsylvania and Dr. Rush, Virginia failed to pass reform until 1821.155  
 
Co-Equal in Dignity and Rights? 
 Individual dignitarianism emerged as a profound force for revolutionary social change in 
colonial America. While British philosophers and Protestant theologians provided an intellectual 
foundation for politicizing dignity talk, Americans from Edwards to Jefferson re-invented 
dignitarian demands for the American political project. Dignitarian thought recognized a dual 
human depravity and material and political needs, departing from the Stoics view of an inward 
dignity. And, to many observers, Edwards’ millenarian prophecy of the United States seemed to 
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come true. Samuel Adams’ exhortation for “co-equal dignity and freedom” embodied efforts to 
secure religious liberties and separation of church and state, to go further in promising free 
speech, to ensure personal privacy and protect the “sanctity of the home,” and to overturn the 
Bloody Codes, prohibit “cruel and unusual punishment,” and whittle away at, or hopefully 
abolish, the death penalty. These changes were nothing short of a revolution. Indeed, individual 
dignitarianism would help form the seedbed for future generations of human rights claims, from 
the labor movement to women’s rights and to civil rights.  
 These “natural” rights were nestled in universal claims to the “dignity of human nature,” 
based on the grant of nature, reason and conscience, divine origin, or, simply, on shared 
humanity. Yet, for all the universal implications of this dignity, founding Americans belied this 
new egalitarianism with grim assumptions about white supremacy, the inferiority of women, and 
an obsession with property ownership. They denied the protection of rights to those considered 
outside of the core political group. Thomas Jefferson, seemingly the most prolific dignitarian, 
owned slaves despite his stated hatred of the institution, and insisted women should have no 
share in active political life. James Wilson believed union outweighed the moral cost of slavery, 
and  supported the three-fifths compromise at the Constitutional Convention. Even Dr. Benjamin 
Rush supported segregating women from institutions of male education. Pernicious behavior 
sometimes merited a fall from dignity. John Adams preached human dignity with revolutionary 
zeal, but in opposition to those who spoke out against the government, supported the Alien & 
Sedition Acts in the name of “national dignity.” This “national dignity,” a collection of all our 
individual dignities into one group, one political community, one United States, may rest on the 
same premises as that of individual human dignity, but it prescribes different political medicines. 
National dignitarianism and its influence is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Two 
Our Source of National Purpose 
 
 
 
 
National dignitarianism is an affirmation of the individual in communion with her fellow 
citizens. Logically, respect for individual and collective dignity demands opposition to the 
tyranny of the many, the few, and the one; sensitivity to and tolerance of pluralism; and, constant 
effort to fulfill the promise of human life. Variation should be expected, and welcomed, in the 
polity’s quest to satisfy these most rigorous of requirements. Indeed, a national dignitarian would 
align pluralism and tolerance with the national interest.  
Often, though tragically not always, national dignity ideas followed the teachings of the 
Moderate Enlightenment and reconciled the seemingly disparate elements of liberalism and 
republicanism, nationalism and democracy, and the state and individual to impressive degrees. 
Just as individuals are expected to respect each other’s rights, in the context of a national dignity, 
the citizen and state both share duties. National dignity can only be enhanced through the state’s 
respect of the individual and their rights. Citizens, meanwhile, have entered into a compact of 
shared political equality, together committed to the community’s survival. Empathy, virtue, and 
comradery are imperative for a flourishing republican polity and morally required in order to 
meet the dignity demands of fellow citizenship.  
The politics of President John F. Kennedy best embody the modern expression of 
national dignitarian thought. Government as service to the citizen was at the core of Kennedy’s 
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address accepting the Liberal Party’s nomination for president in 1960. It was a landmark 
document for dignitarian thinking: “I believe in human dignity as the source of national 
purpose.” Government’s responsibility is commitment to citizens’ welfare – “their health, their 
housing, their school, their jobs, their civil rights, and their civil liberties” – through “social 
invention, with political skill, and executive vigor.” Assuredly, Kennedy believed in no “super 
state,” but knew government provision of genuine public goods that aid dignity is a “precious 
obligation” to its citizens. The commitment to dignity is not predicated on a “fixed platform,” but 
is “an attitude of mind and heart.”156 Kennedy’s speech highlighted government’s responsibility 
to its citizens. His inaugural address, however, is perhaps best known for pointing to the 
reciprocal nature of national dignitarianism. By tasking Americans, “ask not what your country 
can do for you – ask, what you can do for your country,” Kennedy points to the duties citizens 
have to each other and the nation.157  
Founding national dignitarians anticipated the wishes and appeals of Kennedy. “Vigor” 
and “zeal for firmness and efficiency” in a government, Hamilton argued, is the “safest course 
for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness.”158 The North Star of government must be the 
common good. There are also shared duties to laws as a mode of respecting equal dignity. “If 
one free man, an original sovereign, may [be bound to follow the law],” James Wilson questions, 
“why not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do all this likewise? If the 
dignity of each singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be unimpaired.”159 Properly 
cultivated, national dignity builds upon itself as a tool for national identity and spirit. John 
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Adams makes this clear: “We may call this national vanity or national pride, but it is the main 
principle of the national sense of its dignity, and a passion in human nature, without which 
nations cannot preserve the character of man.”160 Government must inculcate trust through 
action, by upholding the dignity of its citizens at home and abroad. Americans must feel able to 
hold their heads up high in the company of other Americans and other nations. Founding national 
dignitarians sought to cultivate national dignity through respectability amongst nations, and 
through virtuous government to protect rights and promote the common good. At its best, 
national dignitarianism was a constructive tool to forge a new nation built from solidarity, fellow 
citizenship, and institutions that valued and recognized human worth. 
Oftentimes, however, that impulse to secure “national dignity” proved more destructive 
than constructive. For those outside of the accepted political group, national dignity often 
subsumed claims to individual human dignity. The quest for respect abroad frequently drove 
founding Americans to morally dubious acts, from Adams’ Alien and Sedition Acts to unequal 
treatment of diplomatic partners to aggressive expansionism into Native American territory. 
Indeed, most founders thought of Native American land as simply terra nullius, unoccupied, 
uncivilized and untilled, therefore ripe for the taking.161 This “doctrine of discovery” and the 
aggression that followed denied sovereignty and dignity to millions of Native American men, 
women, and children across the continent. At home, rankism lured founders into false 
invocations of dignity to suppress the vote, curtail freedoms of speech and the press, and justify 
the oppression of women and people of color. This chapter will explore these contradictory 
contours that founding Americans navigated in their mission of national purpose.  
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National Dignity and Republicanism 
  
 National dignity’s first and greatest influence is republicanism. Republican theory was, 
itself, heavily informed by Aristotelian politics and Renaissance humanism. At republicanism’s 
heart is the notion of vivere civile, “to live as citizens,” whereby the polity exists as a “perfect 
partnership of all citizens and all values.”162 Pica della Mirandola’s 1486 Oration on the Dignity 
of Man offers further insight into the nature of this partnership. Humanity’s dignity is not based 
on reason, or some unmerited “rank” in the world of creation. Our dignity is expressed socially. 
It comes from our share “in the particular endowment of every other creature,” molded in the 
image of God and in communion with each other.163 As J.G.A. Pocock rightly points out, this 
reasoning shares commonalities with the idea of agape, the “love of God for man and of man for 
God,” and Aristotle’s philia, “brotherly love.”164 Extreme individualism – where we see human 
beings as isolated or singular units – prohibits thinking of political and community relationships. 
Indeed, it defeats the reason for being human.  
 This is where dignitarianism meets republicanism. It is also a radical departure from 
liberal views of a political community. Instead of a necessary collection of self-interested 
denizens, begrudgingly compromising for corporal safety, republicanism endorses a value-
oriented citizenship. Following Aristotle, citizenship becomes a vocation, a “universality of 
participation” and action wherein the needs of the individual and of the greater good can be 
fulfilled.165 Aristotle makes it clear, however, that there are citizens who can participate and 
those who are qua citizens, living in the polity but not part of the political process. But 
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republicans, in the dignitarian lens, cannot be de jure homogenous by race, class, gender, 
religion or interest. Although ideas of the citizen as property-owner polluted this framework, 
founding dignitarians, especially James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, promoted an 
expansive republic devoted to individual and a national dignity as the surest mode of protecting 
liberty and the common good.   
 
The Rebirth of Classical Republicanism 
The story of national dignity in America begins with the rebirth of the republican 
tradition in Renaissance Florence. The city itself has a rich mythology. As J.G.A. Pocock writes, 
Renaissance humanists branded Florence as the cradle for ancient republicanism, claiming the 
city to be once home to “Etruscan city republics” and later the foundation of the Roman 
republic.166 If the city should be credited as the locus for Renaissance republican thought, it 
should also be recognized as the site where humanists revived the Stoic formulation of dignity 
and transformed it with the aid of imago Dei language to campaign for self-governance and 
human flourishing. The republicanism of Italian city states, to be clear, was not some 
cosmopolitan force to promote open borders or freedom everywhere. Instead, it helped open the 
door to more liberal, communitarian ideas that would shape future English republicans and the 
American founding generation.  
The scholar and poet Francesco Petrarca (anglicized as Petrarch), Colucccio Salutati, the 
long-time secretary of state of Republican Florence, and his pupil Leonardi Bruni, were the 
leaders in the reconstruction of Cynic-Stoic dignity. They innovated dignity language to be 
concerned with human material needs and progress versus arbitrary rank. In his later work De 
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remediis, “On Remedies,” for example, Petrarch is forcefully anti-rank: “A father may love and 
make rich, but he cannot make noble…the invisible rays of glory shine not out nor are 
transmitted by the power of mortal direction.”167 Like the Stoics and theologians of antiquity, 
Petrarch supported a human dignity based on imago Dei theology.168 That condition, however, 
isn’t enough for a flourishing life or community. That endeavor is the work not only of 
individuals but of nations. Salutati agreed. Dignity is an “excellence of [moral] goodness,” he 
argues, “which from the beginning has been common to us [all]” – in other words, dignity is 
“common sense.”169 Tyranny violates dignity; indeed it violates common sense. Since humanity 
is bound by divine law, natural law, and our own civic bonds, governments must endeavor not 
just to show “favor to those who ask it…[but to] those who do not ask.” That is, it is the state’s 
duty to take care of all of its citizens, especially its weakest. And, the best government for that 
purpose is a republic governed by the rule of law. Should a tyrant take power, it is the citizenry’s 
duty to oppose him or her.170 
Leonardo Bruni carried on Salutati’s work as Chancellor of Florence and chief advocate 
of civic republicanism in 1410. In his panegyric speech “Praise for the City of Florence,” he 
claimed Florentines are well invested by their Roman heritage. Florence, Bruni recounts, was 
born in the “struggle of tyranny” against the Caesars, Neroes, and Tiberiuses who destroyed the 
“liberty, honour, and dignity of the Roman people.” In shows of Italian and republican solidarity, 
not cosmopolitanism, Bruni argued Florence has historically “taken up the cause of other cities, 
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and shielded them from attack;…[fighting] for the liberty of all Italy.” Bruni also prided 
Florence on its domestic political system. A system of checks and balances maintained 
Florentine freedom, he argued, keeping the magistracies, officials, and judiciary in check. Most 
importantly, the Florentine constitution promoted a “sense of equity” and maintained “equal 
rank.” Even the poorest of citizens could say, “I also am a Florentine citizen.”171 
 
The Radical Whigs, Republics, and Utopias 
The tumultuous English Civil Wars of the mid-17th century and the oppressive 
dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell gave birth to a new generation of republicans in England. The 
greatest proponents of republicanism and dignitarianism were John Milton, the 17th century poet 
and political pamphleteer, the contemporary political theorist James Harrington, and Algernon 
Sidney, a British Member of Parliament during the Long Parliament. Milton, Harrington, and 
Sidney’s republicanism were strongly influenced by the Florentine republicans, and are largely 
complementary with each other: they charted a broader polity filled with varying interests, 
opposed to hierarchy, and united by patriotic affection. This vision of a republic was a national 
paideia, whereby citizens would come together to become “virtuous, noble and high spirited” 
through seeking truth and the common good.172 Theirs was, in Aristotelian terms, a government 
of the “many” not the “few,” committed to public welfare and individual flourishing.  
Milton’s work reveals a stark commitment to individual liberty and autonomy as well as 
reverence for human dignity. His writings on the relationship of the individual and communities 
to the state provide us with a “reflection of seventeenth-century republicanism” which Supreme 
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Court Justice Holmes called “the theory of our Constitution.”173 His 1649 pamphlet on the 
“Tenure of Kings and Magistrates” in particular offers an illuming gaze into his merging of 
dignity and republicanism. Republican citizens truly “love freedom heartily,” and must strive to 
govern themselves according to reason and virtue. To submit to a “double tyranny” of custom 
and blind affections to some monarch makes them “slaves within doors.”  People are born 
naturally free, “being the image and resemblance of God himself, and were, by privilege above 
all the creatures born to command.”174 Even with the Fall, this means that government, by the 
demands of human nature, must be participatory. As Samuel Beer rightly argues, Milton makes 
this leap by fashioning liberty of conscience as a “social necessity.”175 Individuals and society 
are interdependent, striving to discover truth. 
 The result is a “national republic” committed to the public good and open deliberation.176 
The polity embraces pluralism by way of social diversity, though Milton never writes on the 
issue of race and citizenship. His love of England and the English people is certain. To Milton, 
an English nation has a “quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit” that can reach “the highest that 
human capacity can soar to.”177 It is not, at least on paper, a nation based on race or class. 
Samuel Beer again puts it best: the republic’s “differences drew it together in the collateral 
intercourse and interdependence of self-government.”178 Sadly, the hopes of Milton were quickly 
dashed by the rise of Oliver Cromwell. The new Commonwealth government was decisively 
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illiberal and largely anti-republican thanks to Cromwell’s virtual dictatorship. Still, the radical 
Whigs persisted in their advocacy.  
James Harrington next picked up the republican torch. Harrington’s life was marred by 
tragedy and upheaval. He was rumored to have witnessed King Charles II’s execution; struggled 
to publish his works under the yoke of Cromwell’s regime; and, was falsely imprisoned in 1661 
after the Restoration. Before his imprisonment, however, Harrington published The 
Commonwealth of Oceana in 1656. Like More’s Utopia, Harrington’s Oceana is another in a 
line of works envisioning a utopian republic. Harrington doesn’t use the term “dignity” like 
Milton, but dignity ideas are present. Government, to Harrington, is “no other than the soul of a 
nation or city,” based on the souls of its occupants, or rather their individual dignity. The 
resulting system is a commonwealth of liberty that is “an empire of laws, and not of men,” a 
phrase which lent itself to John Adams’ Thoughts on Government: “[T]he true idea of a republic 
is ‘an empire of laws, and not of men.’”179 
 And so, Harrington and Adam’s vision of the rule of law is totally grounded in the 
dignity of the human person. Just as critical for respecting the dignity of our personhood is the 
ability of a sovereign, free people to rule themselves and hold governors accountable. In 
contemplating authority, and whence it derives, Harrington rejects dignity as rank: “And says 
Solomon, There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, which procedes [sic] from the 
ruler…Folly is set in great dignity [as rank] and the rich.” Human beings, he poetically argues, 
have “wander’d the earth to find out the balance of power,” on which we may base legitimate 
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governments. How amazing that it had always been a power found in ourselves, “nearer Heaven, 
or to the image of God, which is the soul of man.”180  
Algernon Sidney’s republicanism was decidedly more radical than that of Harrington or 
Milton, especially for his reasoning on the basis of human dignity. Sidney refused to believe that 
“God hath created man in such a state of misery and slavery” his detractors believed they had 
been. Sidney employed theology to argue that since God created humanity in in natural liberty, 
people have like right over their creation: “Governments…are created by man. They who give a 
being to them, cannot but have a right of regulating, limiting and directing them as best pleaseth 
themselves.” Human flourishing is absolutely essential in Sidney’s vision of republicanism, and 
innate in the “publick good.”181 Sidney makes it clear that achieving the public good should not 
betray the natural equality with which human beings are born. He opposes placing the rights of 
the virtuous above the common citizen, even if it is self-evident that the most virtuous should be 
elected to positions of power. It is issue of the process of inclusive deliberation as definitional to 
the public good that makes Sidney a republican dignitarian. Milton believed universal free 
speech and freedom of conscience could draw societies closer to universal truths; Harrington 
seeks the rule of law and accountability by recognizing the preciousness of individual dignity; 
while Sidney identifies the common good “first with justice,” where the “laws…make no 
distinction of persons.” The “equality of the citizen,” for Sidney, is the prime virtue of republican 
government.182  
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The Commonwealthmen Theory of Republics 
  The dignitarian republicanism of Sidney, Harrington, and Milton and other radical Whigs 
were carried on by the “Commonwealth Men” in early 18th century Britain. The Commonwealth 
Men were propelled to the fore of British political debate thanks to the republican ideals affirmed 
by the Glorious Revolution in 1688. While their efforts at reform failed to gain traction in 
Britain, they proved hugely influential in the colonial United States. Commonwealth theories of 
republicanism departed from older radical Whigs by emphasizing the Roman Republic as the 
best expression of self-governance. Walter Moyle, an early associate of Trenchard and prolific 
classicist, was especially notable for this contribution. His Essay upon the Roman Government 
perceived marked parallels between English and Roman political developments. He argues that 
true constitutions contained a “proper distribution into several branches,” operating as a whole, 
but with “each branch [as] a check upon the other.”183 From Salutati and Bruni, to Milton, and on 
to Moyle, we see more concrete visions of dignitarian republicanism emerge; but, still, like his 
predecessors, Moyle bases his convictions on a similar theological metaphysics. He identifies 
that imago Dei ideas were present in all of “civilized” history: “the best Philosophers form an 
Idea o’ him by his Wondrous Works,” that of women and men.184 Further, Moyle obsessed over 
human flourishing. The ideal mode of life is the “Image of Humane Life,” best achieved in a free 
state that cultivated “courage, liberty, and equality.”185 These realities, he argues, were molded 
into the law of Republican Rome, supported by liberty of conscience, naturalization of 
foreigners, and a clergy who abstained from tithes and banal demonstrations of power.186  
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  John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon shared Moyle’s disdain for absolutism, but went 
even further with their opposition to all forms of monarchy, even diluted versions in mixed 
systems. Quoting Sidney in Cato’s Letters, “Liberty cannot be preserved if the manners of the 
people are corrupted; nor absolute monarchy introduced.” Then, going further in their criticism 
of monarchy, they argued that all men “naturally follows that which is good,” this is common 
sense, and any form of monarchy corrupts these natures with vices and injustices.187 A natural 
accomplice to this corruption of human nature is a complicit clergy. When tyranny enjoins itself 
to the clergy, it “degrades” the “dignity [of the human soul]” by promoting “superstition… 
delusive phantoms, and ridiculous dreams.” Arguing for toleration, Gordan and Trenchard 
invoke a spirit of solidarity in the name of the common good. Gordon best articulated this as a 
“publick spirit,” that embodies not just the “love of one’s country,” but a “passion to promote 
universal good, with personal pain, loss and peril: It is one man’s care for many, and the concern 
of every man for all.” This is opposed to the trappings of “wealth and empire.” The public spirit 
not only demands that we, as citizens, act in service to one another, but that we fervently oppose 
a society of “one complexion, of one size, and of one age…of the same mind.”188  
 Gordon and Trenchard’s call to pluralism and union must be weighed against 
considerations of who could join their union. They praise free Protestant countries, but are quick 
to despise Catholics and despair of the tyrannies in Asia and Africa. This contrast is made in the 
starkest language: “We are men, and they are slaves.”189 Undoubtedly, they were warning 
tyranny was dehumanizing to both the ruler and the ruled, but this kind of talk was likely 
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deleterious to their hopes of spreading republicanism. If “they” are slaves, they being applied to 
all Asians and Africans, and the loss of liberty a difficult to recover thanks to the staying power 
of absolutism, then it isn’t difficult to conclude that they also believed white Protestant Anglo-
Saxons were best suited to the cause of liberty. We should not apply this mode of thinking to all 
commonwealthmen, however. Others, particularly Richard Molesworth and John Toland, were 
much more evidently open to naturalization.190 As Molesworth wrote, a “Genuine Whig is for 
promoting a general Naturalization upon the firm Belief, that whoever comes to be incorporated 
into us, feels his Share of all our Advantages and Disadvantages,” that all could take part in the 
public spirit.191 Toland, an Irish nationalist, was an enthusiastic student of John Milton – 
authoring one of the first biographies of Milton – and drew inspiration from Jewish theology, 
ancient Druids, pantheism, Christianity and the classics. Along with being a staunch republican, 
he argued that the Irish should have self-governance and that Jews ought to be naturalized and 
share in equal rights. And, exposed as he was to Catholicism in his youth, he largely restrained 
from vilifying other Catholics (though he certainly joined in bashing Popery).192  
 Those Florentine republicans, radical Whigs and Commonwealthmen who advocated for 
liberty and equality for all found themselves committed to an expansive republicanism grounded 
in the reality of the dignity of the human person. This dignity demands recognition and respect – 
and, allows for reason, virtuous passions, and solidarity. Though biases, racisms, and other 
antagonisms obfuscated the path towards true liberty and equality, their work prompted the 
discovery and cultivation of the public spirit through the exaltation of the basic goodness of the 
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human mind and spirit. This recognition of a common-sense moralism lent itself to the political 
language, laws, rights, and institutions at the heart of the American founding and efforts at 
forming a more perfect Union. Americans now had the chance to, in the words of historian David 
Ramsay, “assert the dignity of human nature, and the capacity of mankind for self-
government.”193 
 
The Spirit of American National Dignity 
The role of the Union – of a national federal republic – was both emotional and rational, 
drawing Americans together in a profound sense of spirit. As the historian Paul C. Nagel argued 
in One Nation Indivisible, the Union as “Spirit” reconciled the contrary elements of the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism, emblematic of developments in the Moderate Enlightenment. 
This spirit was most strongly influenced by the calls to citizenship from founders like James 
Wilson and George Washington. For Wilson, the Union would embody collective dignity, the 
“very life and soul,” by being a “Union of hearts and affections.” Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, particularly of the Jeffersonian persuasion, alike shared this conviction.194 
The American Revolution and Founding was an endeavor to establish a new course. The 
quest for national dignity fostered a new sense of nationality and patriotism. National 
dignitarians like James Wilson, James Madison, and others, were tasked with constructing a 
republic designed to function in a world still occupied by tyrants and monarchs. The 
revolutionary break from reactionary thinking was no easy feat. Progress towards Union was 
perilous and laden with uncertainty. And, the Founders obviously failed at a great many things: 
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John Adams regressed in trying to assign the President regal titles and in passing the Alien and 
Sedition Acts; Benjamin Franklin’s “self-help” mantra confused charity and social aid with 
dependence; competition for land as an “expansive republic” translated into colonialism more 
often than pluralism; and the cruelties of slavery blighted hopes for equality. 
 These shortcomings highlight a second source of national dignitarian thought, aside from 
republicanism. That is the corrupting allure of empire, a staggeringly dehumanizing form of 
politics that is antithetical to individual dignity and bolstered by rankisms and racisms of all 
kind. The United States was founded in a period where monarchs and aristocrats and other 
fanatical authoritarians still dominated most peoples. It must be emphasized that this was a 
period of transition. In moving to a national dignity that prioritized the human worth of its 
citizens, founding Americans often grafted rank-based dignity claims to its politics, laws, and 
institutions. With little credibility or capital, Americans had to earn recognition and respect from 
European powers despite those nations’ aversion to republican values. While trying to maintain 
their status as a different kind of nation, founding Americans still often emulated the imperial 
attitudes of Europeans. National dignity, thus, was also weaponized as an expression of dignity 
as rank, clashing with the individual dignity claims that provided the foundation for rights talk in 
the United States. The results were usually self-defeating, if not catastrophic.   
The most conspicuous instance of this was John Adams’ campaign for lofty presidential 
titles. As Washington’s Vice President, Adams formed a “Titles Committee” that proposed 
presidential titles such as “Excellency,” “Elective Highness,” and even “His Highness!”195 Most 
Americans scoffed at the endeavor. Jefferson remarked it was the “most superlatively ridiculous 
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thing I ever heard of.”196 Adams’ campaign failed, buckled by accusations of monarchical 
ambition. Still, for all their failures, racisms, classism, misogyny, and more, most founders still 
recognized the “dignity of human nature.” The United States’ aims to cultivate its citizens at 
home and secure respect abroad were complex in methods and goals, often confusing the 
“common good” with empire and titles – temptations the old republicans warned against. Dignity 
considerations seeped into almost every institutional decision, from the American system of 
federalism to political economy, and from civil rights at home to diplomacy abroad.  
 
First Principles: Virtue and the Common Good  
 Before we can discuss institutional adaptions of national dignity ideas, we must, like with 
the old republicans, consider how the American founders viewed virtue and the common good – 
or, terms like the “common interest,” “public interest,” and “national interest.” That the founders 
were preoccupied with virtue is an understatement. Their embrace of virtue ethics are often 
overlooked, especially in classical liberal readings of founding texts. For example, many scholars 
tend to focus on James Madison’s view of a depraved humanity or ambition as the driving force 
in politics. Alone, none of those views quite work, especially in wider consideration of 
Madison’s life and writings. While Madison comes to conflicting conclusions on virtue and 
ambition in the Federalist Nos. 51, 55, and 57, Madison firmly claims that the Constitution 
depends on virtue “[to a] higher degree than any other form of government.” There is an 
immense trust placed on the citizen to be virtuous, and to select virtuous leaders. 
 What exactly, however, makes a citizen virtuous? If there was serious dissension between 
the founders, it was on the emphasis of the best virtue or virtues. One of the earliest formulations 
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is located in Benjamin Franklin’s 1726 personal Autobiography, where Franklin created an 
extensive table of thirteen virtues including: temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, 
industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquility, chastity, and humility. And, 
Franklin makes it clear that in his formulation “there was…no mark of any of the distinguishing 
tenets of any particular sect.”  Through habituation of these virtues, all can achieve the life so 
necessary for the public good of the nation. Indeed, Franklin envisioned a “United Party for 
Virtue” consisting of “good men of all nations” rather than a homogenous body of “common 
people.”197 James Madison’s “Virginia Declaration of Rights” enshrines “justice, moderation, 
temperance [and] frugality” as prime virtues.198 What Madison continues to emphasize in his 
writings, however, is that these virtues are far more prevalent amongst the American general 
public that commonly understood. His theory is of “popular virtue”: that due to human dignity 
and common sense, the masses can usually select their representatives well.199 Indeed, this is the 
whole point of representative government. Without virtuous public servants, the republic is 
threatened by corruption. In the Federalist No. 57, Madison makes this clear when he states that 
the “aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who 
possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society.”200  
Even with virtuous rulers, what does this “common good” look like? Life, liberty, 
equality, and human happiness are certainly paradigmatic goals. Madison offers some further 
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insights in the Federalist. The “common interest” is fulfilled by providing for a defense against 
“foreign danger,” both by being able to raise an army and construct “forts, magazines, arsenals, 
dock yards” and other buildings, keeping the peace between the states, safeguarding commerce 
and trade, and promoting “the progress of science and useful arts” via copyright laws.201 Though 
this is not an exhaustive list, Madison’s emphasis is that the republican government is not “a 
narrow district” but must be employed towards a “more enlarged plan of policy.”202 Achieving 
the common good must also entail protecting “the rights of other citizens…[or] of the 
community” against faction.203 Madison’s prescription for combatting faction is an expansive 
republic. Pluralism in views and backgrounds necessitates Madison’s “compound republic” by 
engendering “a coalition of a majority….on [principles] of justice and the general good.”204 
The process for attaining this “general good” is not all that different from that of 
Harrington or Sidney. Madison emphasizes both a democratic process and cultivating virtue in 
public officials to achieve it. “Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives?” 
Madison writes, “Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant…the 
electors are the great body of the people of the United States.” Nowhere in the U.S. House of 
Representatives is it meant that the “few” be elevated “to the ruins of the many.” The structure of 
the House, most importantly, curtails oppression by forming a “communion of interests” with the 
people. 205 Madison’s intention behind the Senate speaks to concerns of individual virtue more 
than communal wisdom. A senator, Madison argues, must have a “greater extent of information 
and stability of character.”206 Government often has a deficiency in fidelity to the happiness of 
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the people and, or, the knowledge to govern. In order to fulfill the common interest, the Senate 
supplies both where one might be lacking. Further, while Madison had argued in Federalist No. 
63 that the role of the Senate is to check “the people against their own temporary errors and 
delusions, at the Constitutional Convention he opposed state legislative selection of senators.207 
He shifted towards more democratic processes later in life.208 
Nor was James Wilson’s conception of the common good much different from his ally, 
James Madison. The object remains human happiness, but the purpose of that happiness is 
greater than enjoyment or mutual self-interest. Quoting Cicero in his Lectures on Law: “There is 
nothing more certain, than the excellent maxim of Plato – that we are not intended solely for 
ourselves; but that our friends and our country claim a portion of our birth.” We contribute to the 
dignity of each other, and thus, the community and nation. Exaltations of the “excellency of man 
is chiefly discerned in [these] great improvements,” lends to progress and “love and friendship,” 
each its own reward. This is Wilson’s vision of national dignity. He agrees with Madison that the 
new constitution is best suited for that aim. In all its functions, it engenders “private affection [to 
be] consistent with the greatest interest of the system,” and where social affection, our common 
bonds of love, friendship, and patriotism, work for the benefit of ourselves.209   
 Dignity is also the basis for Hamilton’s common good in his The Farmer Refuted. “The 
sacred rights of mankind,” Hamilton writes, “are written, as with a sun beam, in the whole 
volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself.” This is a moving account of dignity. 
Those societies that seek the common good model themselves off of this dignity. When the “first 
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principles” of a nation are violated, the “rights of a whole people” are violated, and vice versa. 
Hamilton refutes the precepts of “Mr. Hobbs,” that there is no virtue only restraint by strong 
government. Endowed with “rational faculties,” with dignity, we come to together voluntarily to 
cultivate that preciousness and protect ourselves. 210 
 
A New Nation and the Work of Federalism 
 Deliberations over the common good often were over how to achieve that good.  National 
dignitarians like Wilson had lofty visions for the nation. True communion, the achievement of 
mutual love, progress, and national greatness, could be achieved through the democratic process 
and national sentiment. This does not exclude the role of states, it welcomes them. The steps 
towards federalism were not solely due to the fact that the American colonies were already 
individual sovereignties, or had sought the “federal option” in the 1760s as a method to repair 
relations with Great Britain as Samuel Beer points out.211 The federal choice was long in the 
making, having roots in the republicanism of the radical Whigs in the 18th century, and centered 
on the issue of dignity for individuals and the community. 
 States are not just ex-colonies, or compacts of chagrin forged thanks to human failings. A 
state, Wilson argues in his Lectures on Law, is “a complete body of free persons, united together 
for their common benefit…It is an artificial person.”212 It has feelings, hopes and aspirations; 
interests and duties; and, it has rights. It should be emphasized that Wilson was a centralizer. He 
often took issue with the obsession over states. In Chisholm v. Georgia, for example, he remarks 
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that a toast to the “United States” rather than the “People of the United states” is not “politically 
correct.” Still, this is belied by claims that states are “the noblest work of Man” – a linguistic 
style akin to imago Dei or Locke’s workmanship model. For Wilson, the United States represents 
a scale of “personages,” of concentric levels of dignities. There are individual persons, states, 
and then the national union. Again, though, there are limits to state authority. In those 
overlapping personages, he notes that a state is an artificial intermediary between the individual 
and the nation; indeed, while the Articles of Confederacy dealt only with states, he argues that 
the new national constitution is a compact with individual citizens, transcending the 
“controversies between states.” Firmly stated, “Whoever considers…the general texture of the 
Constitution will be satisfied that the people of the United states intended to form themselves 
into a nation for national purposes.”213 
 In application, Wilson is arguing that state governments must not conflict with the 
individual rights of citizens nor the national purpose and guarantees of the Constitution. States 
certainly have meaning; they are an expression of self-governance and autonomy. But, this new 
compact generated a new set of dignity demands between the individual and the nation, forming 
a new national dignity. Wilson’s 1787 “State House Yard Speech” in favor of the new 
Constitution highlights these positive dignity demands. Most of these targeted defects in the 
Articles of Confederation. For example, Wilson claimed that the “dignity and safety of [a man’s] 
country” depends on a “military force” under the control of a central authority. The power of 
direct taxation, too, was necessary to support both “national safety…[and] the dignity of the 
union.” In losing “national dignity,” the United States would be unable to form treaties or 
enforce their adherence. In remarks to the Pennsylvania legislature on the issue of ratification of 
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the new constitution, Wilson is clear: “By adopting this system, we become a nation; at present, 
we are not one.”  
This was especially the concern of Alexander Hamilton. For Hamilton, dissension 
amongst the states – the “revolt…of North Carolina…disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the 
actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts” – were a critical threat to the “national 
dignity” thanks to the federal government’s ineptitude, particularly its inability to tax or secure 
lines of credit. The very existence of a national republic, Hamilton argues, would work against 
those feelings of enmity, “[adding] the inducements of philosophy to those of patriotism” and 
deterring all “considerations not connected with the public good.”214 Though Hamilton in the 
same essay invokes the teachings of Montesquieu in identifying the “remedy” for quarreling 
states, his and Madison’s prescriptions are not totally in line with Montesquieu’s teachings. 
Montesquieu’s conservatism limits his ideal republic to one with contracted territory and 
homogeneity, otherwise, he argues, it “cannot long subsist.” In large republics, men would be 
driven more by ambition than virtue or “moderation,” leading to quests for glory rather than 
adhering to the common good. Anti-Federalists were quick to adopt this reasoning. “That a 
national government will add to [our] dignity….can admit of no doubt; that it is requisite in order 
to keep us at peace among ourselves, is doubtful.” Erosions to governorships and state 
legislatures, “good and wholesome institutions,” would sully demands of “self-government” 
resulting in a national government by “force only.”215 
For Federalists, the dangers of a shambling confederacy without a strong, centralizing 
nationalism far outweighed the potential downsides. In the Federalist No. 7, Hamilton warns his 
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contemporaries that the sources of internal strife are many, and, under the current government, 
the salves few. Hostilities could arise from territorial disputes; different states could employ 
different forms of government, harming individual liberties; and, worse yet, the “dismemberment 
of the Confederacy” could invite destruction from Europe. Madison agreed: “How much has the 
national dignity…suffered from this cause?” A startling lack of uniformity between states not 
only wasted resources and efforts towards security, but also invited the “perverseness of 
particular States.” In essence, confederacy invited faction. Thus, what was required was a large, 
national republic in order to preserve individual and collective dignity. States remained a useful 
tool for self-governance, even a moral one. Wilson saw that, even though he admitted obsession 
with states’ rights could invoke faction, the “spirit of locality” derided by Madison and Hamilton 
could be a constructive force for good.  
 
A New Diplomacy and the Pursuit for Respect 
American foreign policy in the new republic aimed squarely at the concerns raised by 
those concerned with the national dignity. National dignity demanded that the country command 
respect abroad in order to safeguard liberty. These considerations seeped into most major events 
in early American foreign policy, especially in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War and in 
souring relations with Britain and France in the 1790s. Oftentimes, the dignity of the nation was 
invoked as a proxy for proper civilization or for national grandeur; slights against American 
respectability incurred deep antipathy; and, national dignity concerns were usually linked to the 
survival of the United States itself. George Washington, aware of the precarious state of the 
union, wrote to Henry Lee that “In our endeavors to establish a new government, the 
contest…seems to not have been so much for glory as existence.” Indeed, Washington feared the 
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United States could lose its “federal dignity” and become the “wretched fragments of empire.”216 
This fear was universally shared. In contemplating a potential British acquisition of Florida, New 
Orleans, or other Spanish territories, for example, Alexander Hamilton –a fierce supporter of 
closer ties with Great Britain – resolved that “proper attention to national dignity” would demand 
America “make war.”217 The demands of national dignity frequently cut across factionalism and 
political ideology.   
American diplomacy during the Revolutionary War provides excellent examples of the 
primacy of national dignitarian thought. American ministers and diplomats made pains to 
demand equal reciprocity and equity in partnerships. The Model Treaty, drafted by committee in 
the Continental Congress, and largely by John Adams, was a template for these demands. It first 
took life in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France. The preamble to the Treaty 
emphasizes an “equitable” system of rules for both powers to follow, and a most “perfect 
Equality and Reciprocity” in order to avoid “debate, embarrassment and discontent.” The 
language is excruciatingly delicate. While a “universal Peace” is declared between the nations, 
neither free trade nor military interventions are explicitly agreed to.218 Still, it is notable that 
France was insistent on formal declarations of equality and reciprocity as well. Gravier de 
Vergennes, Louis XVI’s foreign minister, requested such assurances from Franklin and the 
Congress.219  So delicate, however, were these negotiations that the Continental Congress, at 
Benjamin Franklin’s request, stripped John Adams of diplomatic authority after multiple 
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arguments with de Vergennes so Adams could not be “injurious to [the] national dignity.”220 
These episodes underscore the necessity of France’s acknowledgement of the United States as a 
legitimate nation, and speaks to international respectability as valuable currency amongst 
nations.  
Still, while stated equality and reciprocity remained integral components of the Model 
Treaties in the Revolutionary and Early Republican periods, these statements only had limited 
staying power. In comments for the American peace commissioners in Paris, the Continental 
Congress made it clear that while it was in the interest of the nation for the commissioners (i.e. 
Franklin, Adams, John Jay, and Henry Laurens) to consult France throughout the peace 
conference, such a pledge was still humiliating despite our former treaties. “Mr. Madison grants 
that the instructions given are a sacrifice of national dignity,” the report reads, “But it was a 
sacrifice of dignity to policy.” There was profuse debate over whether this attachment to France 
damaged the national image. If Americans attempted to negotiate peace without the French, 
“[would] it repair our loss of dignity in the eyes of the nations of Europe?” Would Americans 
seem unable to control their own affairs, and “veer about on a change of circumstances” making 
an American promise worthless?221 
There remained degrees of enmity towards the French government despite their 
assistance during the war, and their invaluable recognition of American legitimacy. Still, 
American diplomacy maintained its national dignitarian character. The Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce with Prussia contained identical language to the prior treaty with France.222 The 
 
220 “The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Congressional action on engagements with 
France.” Library of Congress. Vol. 5. https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?hlaw:7:./temp/~ammem_3nkG::. 
221 Continental Congress of the United States. “Comments on Instructions to Peace Commissioners, August 8, 
1782.” National Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-05-02-0012.  
222 “A Treaty of Amity and Commerce between His Majesty the King of Prussia, and the United States of America; 
May 17, 1786.” The Avalon Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/prus1785.asp.  
Koslowski 78 
 
major deviations from this formula were the Barbary Treaties and the Treaty with Morocco in 
1786. Instead of using terms like “equality,” oddly, the first article stipulates reciprocal “civility, 
honor, and respect.” Odder still, is the total lack of communiques of equity or reciprocity in the 
Tripoli Treaty of Peace and Friendship or its Tunis counterpart in 1797. Why Americans should 
pursue a different course with North African states over European states is confounding. 
Perhaps, unfortunately, while founding diplomats were keen to get whatever treaty assurances 
they could, they were not willing to state that Morocco or the Barbary States were at all equal.  
 Whether the United States, prior to 1787, could actually maintain their diplomatic 
promises was still a gaping question. Hamilton and Madison’s essays in the Federalist argued 
that only a national republic could assuage national dignitarian concerns. “How can [the United 
States] possess…respectability abroad?,” Hamilton questions, “How can its administration be 
anything else than a succession of expedients…?”223 Though diplomacy in the confederate 
period went relatively unscathed, Hamilton’s fear that internal strife could communicate a 
schizophrenic foreign policy was not unreasonable. Madison echoes Hamilton’s concern of 
intertwining domestic and foreign politics: “Those who represent the dignity of their country in 
the eyes of other nations, was will be particularly sensible to…dishonorable stagnation in public 
affairs.”224   
Ironically, the most controversial treaty came after the adoption of the new constitution. 
If any particular treaty ever raised the ire of nationalist Americans, or caused as much disunion 
in the Founding Era, it was Jay’s Treaty. Signed in 1794, Jay’s Treaty was designed to quell 
tensions with Great Britain, especially in the northwestern territory. John Jay and Alexander 
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Hamilton, both avowed national dignitarians, were the key architects behind the treaty that most 
thought gave away too much for too little. A number of issues in particular angered Madisonians 
and Jeffersonians, the soon to be Democratic-Republicans. First, the treaty was perceived as an 
alignment with Great Britain and a repudiation of revolutionary France. One prominent 
Democratic-Republican, Alexander J. Dallas, later James Madison’s Treasury Secretary, penned 
that the treaty was an “Instrument of Party,” and ought not to have been adopted “for the sake of 
our national dignity.”225 The Pennsylvania Democratic Society, fond of newly republican France, 
argued that “our interest as well as our national dignity” required the United States to stand by its 
friendship with France, else it would risk being drawn into a “painful career of humiliation.”226 
And, in a letter from James Monroe to James Madison, Monroe complained that “Upon this 
application [John Jay] was greatly wounded upon the score of national dignity.”227  
Different interpretations of how to honor the national dignity drove competing visions of 
America’s role in the world: alignment with Britain with a mind towards commerce, or, alliance 
with revolutionary France to proclaim the virtue of republicanism abroad. The events of the 
1790s soured both options. Jay’s Treaty angered Democratic-Republicans, especially as British 
impressment of American merchants continued, while revolutionary bloodshed in France and 
XYZ Affair stoked the ire of Federalists and a good number of Democrats. President John 
Adams invoked the wrath of Anglophiles like Alexander Hamilton for pursuing Washington’s 
policy of neutrality after the XYZ affair. In a scathing letter, Hamilton voiced doubts over 
Adams’ “intellectual endowments” and accused him of having an “unfortunate character.” 
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Adams, Hamilton resolved, was foolish for allowing the national dignity to endure “mortifying 
humiliations” without reparations.228  
Regardless, Washington, Adams, and Jefferson vowed to keep America unentangled 
from the politics of European alliances. Washington feared “our dignity may be lost,” should the 
House and Senate refuse to approve his “general rules” towards France and Britain.229 His 
policies did little to allay the situation. By 1795, Washington believed a conflict was almost 
inevitable. Writing to Patrick Henry, he reasserted his intentions were aligned with the “dignity” 
of the country by trying to “comply strictly with all our engagements, foreign and domestic,” but 
conceded a “crisis is approaching.”230 Before leaving office, Washington warned Americans 
away from an alliance even with impending war. His last address aptly speaks to national 
dignitarian concerns: “That every citizen would take pride in the name of an American…the 
dignity of which will be absorbed…if we enlist ourselves…under the banner of any other nation 
whatsoever.” Unfortunately, these same sentiments would be invoked by President Madison and 
fellow Democratic-Republicans in declaring war on Great Britain in June of 1812. That national 
dignity could be employed to both justify war and pursue strict neutrality speaks to the 
precarious power of nationalism, both as a tool to construct a polity and generate unity and as a 
weapon for domestic politics and unthinking brutality.  
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A New Economy and Manifest Destiny 
 Efforts to secure respect from other nations abroad also lent itself to the endeavor of 
national expansion at home. No better expression of this mission exists than John L. O’Sullivan’s 
1839 article, “The Great Nation of Futurity.” Channeling the spirit of the Declaration, O’Sullivan 
envisioned a nation based on “human equality” that cultivated natural rights in “national life.” 
For O’Sullivan, expansion into the west promised the “moral dignity” of humanity and the 
creation of a “nation of human progress.”231 As a Democrat, however, O’Sullivan was a 
supporter of slavery. His words fall on deaf ears today, but for young nationalists in the Age of 
Jackson his words lent moral fervor to calls for “manifest destiny.” In many ways, O’Sullivan’s 
call for expansion was just an echo of the perversion of national dignity claims already 
expounded by founding Americans. Though national dignitarianism endorses an expansive 
republic rooted in diverse creeds and origins, liberal visions of citizenship tied with property 
only encouraged expansion across the continent. The concept of land as integral to citizenship 
was as widely accepted as deeply rooted in republicanism. This interpretation came about 
primarily as a rejection of feudalism. Whigs like Harrington argued against nobility’s ownership 
of most land, and vociferously for property rights. If landlords or nobles held a monopoly on 
property, then the polity was of a “Gothic balance,” or feudalistic. If “the whole people be 
landlords,” the result is a “commonwealth” republic.232  
 Most founding Americans heartily agreed. Joseph Blasi and Richard Freeman’s 2014 
book The Citizen’s Share makes it abundantly clear that, contrary to common arguments, the 
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founders were acutely aware of inequality.233 Thomas Paine, whose Common Sense stirred the 
nation towards revolution, claimed classism – the “distinctions of rich and poor” – and inequality 
was a consequence of oppression and avarice in monarchies.234 In a letter to Madison, Jefferson 
lamented that “the property of this country is absolutely concentrated in a very few hands,” and 
though conceding total equality of property was “impracticable,” the results of “enormous 
inequality” is the “misery” of humanity. The “small landholders,” he argued, are precious to the 
republic. Founders of the Federalist persuasion also agreed. Madison hoped the United States 
would become a country with the “universal hope of acquiring property.” In a letter on 
immigration, George Washington looked westward for solutions. The “great plenty of unocupied 
[sic] lands” beyond Ohio would be a boon to the settlers who would promote the “wellfare 
of…[the] community.” Echoing national dignitarian concerns, Washington registered disdain for 
“European Publications” who characterized North American as ugly or harsh. Once surveys are 
carried out and the lands settled, Washington surmised, surely Europeans will “[respect] the 
private Life of the Americans; as well as the progress…in their Country.”235  
 Unwilling to use the new government to redistribute property, founding Americans 
looked west towards lands occupied by the Native Americans. At first, federal officials and laws 
aimed to treat Native Americans with the same rules and respect afforded to other nations. And, 
as the United States sought its own respect abroad, reciprocity at home aligned with goals to be a 
new kind of nation. In 1788, the last Confederation Congress reasserted the Treaty of Hopewell 
to chastise settlers from illegally occupying Cherokee land. Henry Knox, later Washington’s 
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Secretary of War, lauded this effort as an “indispensable obligation” of the United States to 
uphold Native Americans’ “national dignity.”236 Further, he claimed that acquiring the Indian 
lands by means other than purchase was a “violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and of 
the distributive justice which is the glory of a nation.”237 Other arguments were more obviously 
self-interested. Winthrop Sargent, a prominent Federalist and Mississippi Territory governor, 
argued that “the [American] national dignity [was] interested in most amply affording” Native 
Americans due respect.238  
Like with the War of 1812, however, the national dignity was often invoked as a casus 
belli in times of strife. When Creek and Cherokee tribes attacked encroaching American settlers, 
the national dignity was invoked by Knox in pressing for a violent response. “The national 
dignity and justice,” he wrote to Washington, “require the arms of the Union should be called 
forth in order to chastise the Creek nation of Indians.” Furthermore, the reputation of the United 
States demanded that missionaries and the “administration of Indian affairs” be undertaken by 
the federal government in order to convince Native Americans to submit to the “will of the 
United States.”239 After brief conflict in 1789-1790, the Treaty of New York was signed at the 
urging of Benjamin Hawkins, Washington’s General Superintendent for Indian Affairs. Hawkins 
appealed to McGillivray, the Creek leader, to consider peace but warned him that excessive 
demands would be rejected as affronts to “national Dignity and Justice.”240 While the treaty 
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recognized the Creeks as a “nation,” it certainly did not establish “equality” or “reciprocity,” 
evident in prohibiting the Creeks from punishing non-Indian crimes within their borders.241 
Soon after the Treaty of New York, acknowledgement of the Native Americans as 
legitimate national actors rapidly evaporated. By the mid-19th century, the United States wholly 
ostracized the Native Americans as not just a nation, but as inhuman. They denied their basic 
human dignity, seen in the Indian Commissioner Francis Walker’s reprehensible remark in 1872: 
“There is no question of national dignity…involved in the treatment of savages by a civilized 
power.”242 Dreams of empire triumphed over the dignitarian ideals of the Moderate 
Enlightenment. Sales contracts and foreign treaties with European powers provided legal 
workarounds to Native American claims of sovereignty.  
The 1803 Louisiana Purchase kicked off this development. Then Minister to France, 
Robert Livingston, communicated to Talleyrand the “pressing nature” of acquiring the Louisiana 
territory. He was concerned  that Spain’s hostility – stemming in part from their support of Creek 
territorial claims – would stoke the “just sense of national independence and national dignity” of 
western settlers towards violence.243 The new territory was already inhabited by Native 
Americans, but the treaty served to justify a pre-arranged contract with a legitimate foreign 
power. Native American tribes in the region were not consulted. The following decades saw 
multitudes of Supreme Court cases that formalized this denationalization and dehumanization of 
the Native Americans.  
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One such case originated in a corrupt sales contract in Georgia. The Yazoo Land Act of 
1795 from the Georgia legislature parceled the Yazoo land – most of Alabama and Mississippi –  
into four sections, selling them for $500,000. Later, it was revealed that the passage of the act 
was contingent on bribes by speculators. This scandal not only pushed Washington to reconsider 
state authority in making arrangements with Native American tribes, but also resulted in the 
1810 landmark Supreme Court case Fletcher v. Peck. Chief Justice Marshall penned the majority 
opinion, ruling that the contract was legitimate despite the legislature’s illegal conduct. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Johnson went further. He argued that the Indian nation is not truly a 
nation: “some have totally extinguished their national fire…[others] hold their national existence 
at the will of the State within which they reside.”244 No longer did they have absolute claim to 
their land, since they were no longer a nation.  
While founding Americans pursued national dignity for the new republic and its 
citizenship, they refused to grant like status to the Native Americans. This is one of the great 
tragedies of national dignity ideas. Though dignitarian language has long emphasized universal 
brotherhood and sisterhood, evident in the texts of the Florentine republicans, the construction of 
the “nation” excluded those viewed not committed to human progress or civilization. Prejudices 
otherized foreigners, but even at home, perversions of national dignity ideas were used to deny 
Americans – citizen and non-citizen – the rights and privileges of the new Union. 
 
A New Citizenship and the Politics of Exclusion 
 National dignitarianism proved to be a double-edged sword during the Founding Era.  
Nationalistic invocations of “dignity” contributed to a heartless encroachment on Native 
 
244 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/10/87/#tab-opinion-1907670. 
Koslowski 86 
 
American lands and denial of their basic humanity. At home, the story is no different. Though 
national dignitarian thought mandates an expansive and pluralistic republic – both in regard to a 
diversity of views and in more liberal immigration policies, the latter particularly thanks to the 
Commonwealthmen – the realities of the American founding era often sundered this legacy. 
Undoubtedly, national dignitarian ideas seek to valorize the “dignity of the citizen.”245 Questions 
over citizenship were, however, plagued by notions of national glory or grandeur, false 
aggrandizements of the respect national dignity sought to secure. Tragically, national dignity 
became a weapon to blunt the rights afforded to American citizens, fed dreams of American 
empire, failed to forge consensus over conflicts on immigration and naturalization, and was 
unable to convince founding Americans to end slavery. 
 Among the most blatant abuses of the national dignity to curtail individual rights were 
John Adams’ Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, which went beyond the denials of individual 
freedoms of speech and press discussed in the first chapter. Reacting to domestic turmoil over 
French and British conflict, Adams claimed that the Acts were necessary to protect the “Peace 
and dignity of the United States.” Adams’ Federalist allies looked to American foreign policy 
concerns as justification. “National dignity,” Representative William Murray argued, “is the 
[real] substance against any and every foreign power which attacks our commerce.”246 
Regardless, the Alien and Sedition Acts constituted an obvious violation of the individual dignity 
that national dignitarians were supposedly committed to protect.  
Clearly, Adams was practicing a politics of exclusion. The list of action taken by the 
federal government against the press is extensive: for example, editors of the Philadelphia 
 
245 Wilson, James. Collected Works of James Wilson. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007). Vol. 2. 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/wilson-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-2.  
246 Smith, James Morton. “The Grass Roots Origins of the Kentucky Resolutions.” The William and Mary 
Quarterly. Vol. 27, No. 2. (April 1970). pp. 221-245.  
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Aurora were arrested for instigating a “United Irish Riot,” undermining “national dignity and 
decorum,” while Federalist politicians claimed the Gazette of the United States in New York 
City undermined the dignity of the Senate, and thus the country. Along with targeting 
Democratic-Republican journalists, the Alien Act extended residency requirements for 
naturalization from five to fourteen years.247 Democratic-Republicans were right to criticize 
Adams for trying to limit the voting population – indeed, one could reasonably argue that this 
was the first statutory instance of partisan voter suppression in American national history.  
Dreams of empire also instilled fear in the new republic. The earliest novel attempts to 
rehabilitate rank in the new republic, or at least a perceived threat to do so, was the creation of 
the Society of the Cincinnati, a fraternal association of Continental Army officers. Now a 
philanthropic organization laudably dedicated to the preservation of colonial texts, the Society in 
1783 was widely considered a threat to equality. Though it invoked the “exalted rights and 
liberties of human nature” in its founding document, the Society also envisioned the “future 
dignity of the American Empire.” This would be supported by the “eldest male posterity” of the 
Society’s members, consisting of “officers of the American Army.” Judge Aedanus Burke, a 
Democratic-Republican from South Carolina, predicted a “hereditary peerage,” eventually 
consuming the republic. His Considerations on the Society or Order of Cincinnati incurred bitter 
debate. Samuel Adams complained to John Adams that this “Order of Military Men” would 
lessen the “Dignity of the States” and end “free Existence.” John Adams heartily agreed.248 In 
1787, the Society was accused of fomenting Shays’ Rebellion and interfering in the 
 
247 Smith, James Morton. “The ‘Aurora’ and the Alien and Sedition Laws: Part II: The Editorship of William 
Duane.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography. Vol. 77, No. 2. (April 1953). pp. 123-155.  
248 Adams, Samuel. “Samuel Adams to John Adams, 16 April 1784.” National Archives. https://archive.is/7fm4b.; 
Adams, John. “John Adams to Samuel Adams, 25 June 1784.” National Archives.  
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Constitutional Convention. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts channeled fears of a Society-led 
coup d’état, resigning that the people could unwittingly “[throw] such a power into their 
hands.”249   
  The threat posed by the Society of the Cincinnati to the republic was greatly exaggerated, 
mostly fodder for tabloid papers and gossip. Far more insidious a threat to dignitarian thinking 
were debates over citizenship and immigration. The 1790s and early 1800s featured a slate of 
naturalization laws – in 1790, 1795, 1798, and 1802 – that the radical Whigs and 
Commonwealthmen might have found abhorrent. It is also demonstrative of the rankish 
ideologies pervasive in the founding generation. Citizenship was contained only to “free white 
persons” of “good character,” and the residency period required for naturalization fluctuated 
rapidly between these acts, ranging from five to fourteen years. These acts show that citizenship 
was considered an impossibility for non-white Americans. Even the most liberal of immigration 
proponents favored rankish restrictions. Hamilton, for example, considered the most “desirable 
class” of immigrants to be those “persons in Europe of moderate fortunes.” 
Still, there was opposition to severe restrictions and perceptions of impartiality. 
Gouverneur Morris’ amendment at the constitutional convention to restrict public office to 
citizens who have resided in the country for fourteen years or more was met with general 
hostility. Benjamin Franklin warned against hardline qualifications for citizenship as showing 
“partiality to the rich,” harming the nation and discouraging the migration of the “common 
people.” If national dignitarianism demands respect of citizens by the government, certainly 
these restrictions would be an affront to recently naturalized citizens. James Wilson, an 
immigrant himself, noted the “discouragement & mortification [immigrants] must feel from the 
 
249 Madison, James et al. “The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 reported by James Madison: July 1825.” 
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degrading discrimination” proposed by Morris. Morris’ argument about emigrants posing a threat 
to the national dignity and “common interest” were quashed.  
Slavery also occupied the minds of Americans concerned with the national dignity. Some 
used ideas of national grandeur to justify the practice. George Whitefield, for example, believed 
slavery would lead to prosperity and national greatness. He celebrated the legalization of slavery 
in Georgia and lauded South Carolina’s slave trade, and promoted its adoption.250 Charles 
Pinckney of South Carolina followed similar thinking. As recorded in the debates over the 
Constitution, “[Pinckney] contended that [slavery] would be for the interest of the whole Union.” 
Others channeled the dignity of the nation to denounce it. John Adams’ Dissertation on the 
Canon and Feudal Law denounced slavery as a “sacrilegious breach of trust”  and antithetical to 
national “honor or interest or happiness,” constitutive goals of national dignitarianism.251 
National dignity failed to generate sufficient opposition to slavery. Notably, Harriet Beecher 
Stowe recognized this in the preface to Uncle Tom’s Cabin: “It was not to whitewash the 
national dignity [that the abolitionist movement gained steam], but to claim a degraded race from 
degradation.”  
 
The Legacy of National Dignity 
 The Janus-faced history of national dignity speaks to its dual capability as a tool for 
national construction and destruction. At its best, national dignitarianism seeks to affirm the 
individual dignity of the polity’s citizens; achieve respect and security abroad; promote self-
respect and a spirit of amity at home; and, achieve the common good. At its worst, national 
 
250 Stein, Stephen J. “George Whitefield on Slavery: Some New Evidence.” Church History. Vol. 42, No. 2. (June 
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dignity is twisted into delusions of national grandeur or glory, informing rankism and racist 
ideologies at home; engendering feelings of national superiority, especially against non-
European states; and, justifying harmful intrusions on the rights of citizens and human beings 
within the polity. National dignity as grandeur continued to exert a terrible influence on 
American politics at home, and engendered feelings of supremacy abroad. As Beth Lew-
Williams accounts in her book The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the 
Alien in America, proponents of Chinese exclusion in the 1870s and 1880s feared the “national 
dignity…was at stake; [as well as] the future of U.S. society and government.”  Polk claimed 
Mexico’s insult to the national dignity justified war over Texas and California, while Woodrow 
Wilson threatened to invade Mexico again to “uphold our national dignity.”   
 Yet, for all its past and potential harm, national dignity ideas still continue to offer the 
hope of fulfilling individual dignity and the common good. Woodrow Wilson’s National Park 
Service Organic Act, which greatly expanded the National Park system, justified itself with 
claims that the parks would increase “national dignity and recognition of their superlative 
environmental quality.” In the area of foreign policy, Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the 
“national dignity” of the newly independent Philippines while John F. Kennedy and Jimmy 
Carter invoked “national dignity” of other nations in their campaigns for international human 
rights in Latin America and Europe. In the 20th century, dignitarians like Roosevelt, Kennedy, 
and Carter demonstrated that the quest for respect can enkindle solidarity amongst nations as 
much as between fellow Americans.  
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Conclusion 
Dignity at the Founding and Today 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has endeavored to show that dignity has had a long and vitally important role 
in shaping the attitudes, politics, and institutions of the United States. The crucible of the 
Revolutionary War, the Great Awakening, and the Transatlantic character of the Moderate 
Enlightenment brought dignitarianism to the fore in American politics. Refashioned in the 
Aristotelian-Stoic language of eudaimonia and the theological language of the “image of God,” 
and tempered by rationalist, liberal tolerance and republican solidarity, dignitarianism 
experienced a major revival during the Renaissance and Enlightenment, initiating a movement 
towards egalitarianism in America and beyond. It was, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, a true 
“dignity revolution.”  
 The American dignity revolution had two elements: individual and national dignity. 
Individual dignitarianism, aided by the writings of Roger Williams, John Locke, and Jonathan 
Edwards, forced a reorientation of the state and the individual. Abridging the words of James 
Madison, founding dignitarians sought to create a government dedicated to the many rather than 
the few. Right triumphed over the cruel and the unusual; diversity of thought accepted over the 
rigidity of uniformity; and, the common celebrated as noble. This too was the basis for national 
dignitarian concerns. Recognizing the collective dignity of each individual citizen placed unique 
demands on the structure of the American political system and not just the individual rights 
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accorded to each citizen. The wisdom of Bruni, Milton, Harrington, Gordon and Trenchard, and 
the many other old republicans implied that a dignitarian republic must ensure de jure pluralism 
through freedom of speech, the press, and relatively liberal immigration policies – all also 
concerns of individual dignity. 
 Yet, the history of dignitarianism in America has not always been a cheerful one. It is 
marred with great tragedy. While individual dignity provided a basis to advance human rights 
and flourishing, national dignity claims often sundered these efforts. When contaminated with 
the rankism of the age, the quest for national respect justified atrocities at home and abroad. John 
Adams, who affirmed individual dignity more than most founders, succumbed to political 
pressures in promoting exclusionary politics with his Alien and Sedition Acts and the 
Naturalization Act of 1798. Jefferson and George Mason, promoters of freedom of conscience, 
participated in a slave system that robbed freedom of choice and autonomy from millions. 
George Washington helped initiate a westward expansion that denied the basic humanity of 
generations of Native Americans. The list is daunting, and an affirmation of the “ascriptivism” 
that Rogers Smith uses to describe the dark tradition ascribing a lack of true dignity to many 
groups that characterizes American politics. The founders’ failures provide a valuable lesson. In 
an age where authoritarian ascriptivists like Narendra Modi, Xi Jinping, Viktor Orban, and more, 
use national dignity language to justify egregious rankisms and racisms, the American founding 
era serves as a warning against these petty, narrow nationalisms.252  
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Foreign Place Names.” The Wall Street Journal. March 23, 2016. 
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In the American founding era the antidote to that ascriptivism, dignitarianism, notched 
many victories: a basis for representative government, numerous individual liberties, and the 
promise of the Declaration of Independence. After the Second World War, dignitarians affirmed 
this dream to billions more with the United Nations’ Declaration of Universal Human Rights. 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” the Preamble proclaims, “They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.”253 The U.N.’s call to recognize dignity has proven to be a launching pad for the 
cause of universal human rights. Venerable organizations like B’Tselem, Dignity Rights 
International, DignityUSA, the Human Dignity Trust, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, and hundreds more, invoke human dignity in their mission to promote justice, 
equality, and freedom for all. 
Even in the United States, the hope of the Declaration of Independence and the 
Declaration of Universal Human Rights still remains to be fulfilled today – the longing of its 
fulfillment is yearned for by millions now, and millions to come – but its spirit instills fire in 
modern thinkers and leaders still waging war against the plague of rankism and discrimination. 
That quest, however, must begin with the need to better understand dignity after the American 
founding. It begins with trying to unweave the influence of human dignity on the women’s rights 
movement that began in the 1820s, the suffrage movement, and modern contests for equality and 
rights to bodily autonomy. It begins with the workers rights’ movement of the 1830s, the rise of 
trade unionism, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, and the call for “dignity of work.” It begins with 
the trials, travails, and triumph of the abolitionist movement and the push for civil rights and 
 
253 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-
rights/.  
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racial equality from the 1860s into the 1960s, and to this day. The tapestry of American history is 
long, and dignity’s story remains untold. More work must be done.  
Today, the United States is experiencing a renaissance in dignity language. Dignity, 
especially in its individualistic variant, occupies modern political discourse with astounding 
frequency. Senator Sherrod Brown, a Democrat from Ohio, even included the phrase in his re-
election campaign slogan: “The Dignity of Work.”254 Vice President Joseph Biden regularly 
invokes dignity. In reminiscing about his father, “A job is about a lot more than a paycheck – it’s 
about dignity”; or, when invoking his Catholic faith, “Everyone’s entitled to dignity, that’s a 
basic tenet in my household.”255 Perhaps the most innovative use of dignity language comes 
from Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Her campaign website says politics “is about 
championing the dignity of our neighbors,” adroitly laying claim to the tradition of individual 
worth and the social aspect of dignitarian thought. She also uses it to justify her commitment to 
social democracy, claiming, “When we talk about the word socialism, I think what it really 
means is just democratic participation in our economic dignity, and our economic, social, and 
racial dignity…To me, what socialism means is to guarantee a basic level of dignity.”256  
 Dignitarian goals are also occasionally considered by politicians and intellectuals on the 
center-right, though it is notable, and sad, to point out that the use of the term “dignity” is often 
absent in conservative speech today. One of the great exception’s to that observation is Senator 
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Marco Rubio of Florida. Rubio often talks about the “dignity of work” from the vantage point of 
Catholic social teaching, and occasionally when discussing his opposition to abortion rights. It is 
an innovating recognition of the connection between individual dignity and national prosperity 
and flourishing. 257 President Trump’s rhetoric, on the other hand, lacks the soul of 
dignitarianism. He mentioned national dignity in his most recent remarks on a potential Middle 
East Peace Plan between Israel and Palestine, and used it when bashing Hillary Clinton during 
the 2016 election: “we are going to end the Clinton Corruption and restore dignity and honesty to 
government service.” It should be noted, however, that most of Trump’s uses of dignitarian 
language is limited to pre-written presidential proclamations, memoranda, prepared remarks, or 
press releases, rather than during his off-the-cuff speeches at rallies.258 Trump’s speech, not just 
due to its conspicuous lack of dignity, but because of its active denial of it through disturbing and 
othering rhetoric, must be described as ascriptivist.259 It is often an echo of America’s darker 
political traditions. Thankfully, a number of enterprising conservatives have chosen to use 
nationalist dignity language aimed at this ascriptivism. For example, the rightwing magazine The 
Bulwark recently published an article titled “How to Restore Our National Dignity” by Susan 
Wright. Wright summons the spirit of Reagan’s “A Time for Choosing” speech in denouncing 
Trump and the new left in the Democratic Party.260  
That contemporary politicians and thinkers continue to invoke the moral gravity of 
dignity points to the staying power of dignitarianism, not just thanks to the framework’s 
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importance in modern human rights discourse, but also due to its role early in the nation’s 
history. Though dignity has been used in different ways by different people at different times, it 
is inarguable that the core tenets of the U.S. Constitution, “to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty,” express the hopes of human dignity. It is 
inarguable that the Declaration of Independence asserts the radical equality and immeasurable 
worth of human life when it holds that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights.” In a time fraught with dissonance, doubt, and 
discontent, hopefully the poetry of human dignity will remind us “we are not enemies, but 
friends,” and call us to the better angels of our nature.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Koslowski 97 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
I would like to first thank my family. My Mom and Dad, Ann Marie Koslowski and Richard 
Koslowski, for their unconditional love and support during my time at the University of 
Pennsylvania and the writing of this thesis. They taught me to see the inherent dignity of all 
people, the need for not just tolerance, but solidarity, and the duties we owe to each other as 
fellow human beings. Thanks goes also to my wonderful sister, Hallie Koslowski, who has made 
me laugh when I faced obstacles and demonstrated the “dignity of work” in her endeavors to 
learn about and improve public health and safety. 
 
I owe a special thanks to my research advisor, Professor Rogers M. Smith. He has been an 
infallible guide, a source of inspiration, and a great mentor and comfort during this process. It 
has been an honor and privilege to have had him as a professor, to have conducted research for 
him, and to have written this thesis under his guidance. For all of our weekly meetings, for the 
hours you spent reading over the drafts of this thesis, and for the edits and suggestions that made 
this a stronger thesis: from the bottom of my heart, thank you.  
 
This project could also not have been accomplished without the mentors, teachers, and friends 
who have advised me, shaped me, kept me company, and have affirmed that proverb that wealth 
is in the friendships we hold. You all have made me a rich man, indeed. To Dr. Eileen-Doherty 
Sil, Dr. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Ms. Clara Hendrickson, Dr. Ana Zorrilla, Mr. Ben Keesey, and so many 
more, I thank you all. To all of my friends who encouraged me and offered me support  – Cyrena 
Gonzalez, David Guardiola, James Lenden, Charles Sansone, Jake Soifer, Andrew Toth, Billy 
Valerio, Hannah Walsh, and many more – thank you all so much. It meant the world to me, and 
made this a better paper. 
 
I would also like to extend a wholehearted thanks to the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Department of Political Science for the opportunity to do this work, and for their flexibility in the 
middle of the COVID-19 crisis, and the University’s Library and staff for their help to find the 
resources to write this thesis.  
 
Finally, I’d like to thank one last source of inspiration. To my grandfather Charles Rhoades, 
“Poppops,” who taught me that dignity persists even in the darkest moments of human life, this 
thesis is dedicated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Koslowski 98 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
“A Treaty of Amity and Commerce between His Majesty the King of Prussia, and the United  
States of America; May 17, 1786.” The Avalon Project. 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/prus1785.asp. 
 
“Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, January 16, 1786.” Library of Virginia.  
https://edu.lva.virginia.gov/dbva/items/show/180. 
 
“American Presidency Project.” University of California Berkeley.   
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.  
 
 “Constitution of Pennsylvania – September 28, 1776.” The Avalon Project. 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp. 
 
“Dialogue on Civil Liberty.” The Pennsylvania Magazine. Philadelphia, January 1776; 2,  
American Periodicals. 
 
“First Inaugural Address of Ronald Reagan.” January 20, 1981. Avalon Project.  
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/reagan1.asp.  
 
“Highlights from Joe Biden’s Vision for America.” Biden for President.  
https://joebiden.com/catholics/. 
  
“Home – The Dignity of Work Tour.” https://dignityofwork.com/.  
 
“How Will History Books Remember the 2010s?” Politico Magazine. December 27, 2019.  
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/27/how-will-history-books-remember-
the-2010s-089796.  
 
“Inaugural Address of Jimmy Carter.” The Avalon Project. January 20, 1977.  
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/carter.asp.  
 
“PM Modi completes stunning debut year in international affairs; recasts India’s image on the  
world stage.” The Economic Times. May 10, 2015. 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-modi-completes-
stunning-debut-year-in-international-affairs-recasts-indias-image-on-the-world-
stage/articleshow/47216970.cms?from=mdr.  
 
“Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Massachusetts; February 6, 1788.” The Avalon  
Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratma.asp.  
 
“Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New Hampshire; June 21, 1788.” The Avalon  
Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratnh.asp. 
 
Koslowski 99 
 
“Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York; July 26, 1788.” The Avalon Project.  
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp.  
 
“State and Continental Origins of the Bill of Rights.” Teaching American History.  
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/resources/bor/origins-chart/.  
 
“The Character of the American Patriot.” The Royal American Magazine. Boston, February  
1774; 1, 2,; American Periodicals. 
 
“The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Congressional action on  
engagements with France.” Library of Congress. Vol. 5. https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?hlaw:7:./temp/~ammem_3nkG::. 
 
“The Virginia Declaration of Rights.” National Archives.  
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/virginia-declaration-of-rights.  
 
“The Virginia Declaration of Rights.” National Archives.  
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/virginia-declaration-of-rights.  
 
“Thomas Jefferson First Inaugural Address.” The Avalon Project.  
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp.  
 
“Transcript of Alien and Sedition Acts (1798).” Our Documents.  
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=16&page=transcript.  
 
“Transcript of Articles of Confederation (1777).” Our Documents.  
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=3&page=transcript.  
 
“Transcript of President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address (1961),” Our Documents.  
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=91&page=transcript.  
 
“Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between The United States and France; February 6, 1778.” The  
Avalon Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fr1788-1.asp.  
 
“Treaty With the Creeks: 1790.” The Avalon Project.  
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/cre1790.asp.  
 
“Virginia Resolution – Alien and Sedition Acts.” The Avalon Project.  
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virres.asp.  
 
Adams, John. “From John Adams to the President of Congress, 5 September 1783.” National  
Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-15-02-0116.  
 
Adams, John. “John Adams to Samuel Adams, 25 June 1784.” National Archives.   
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-16-02-0148.  
 
Koslowski 100 
 
Adams, John. “Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams.” April 27, 1777. Massachusetts  
Historical Society. https://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17770427ja. 
 
Adams, John. “To Richard Henry Lee.” November 15, 1775.  
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-03-02-0163.  
 
Adams, John. A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law. 1765.  
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/a-dissertation-on-the-canon-and-
feudal-law/.  
Adams, John. The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: with a Life of  
the Author, Notes and Illustrations, by his Grandson Charles Francis Adams. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1856). Vols. 3-4. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/adams-the-
works-of-john-adams-vol-3-autobiography-diary-notes-of-a-debate-in-the-senate-essays.  
 
Adams, Samuel. “Samuel Adams to John Adams, 16 April 1784.” National Archives.  
https://archive.is/7fm4b. 
 
Adams, Samuel. The Writings of Samuel Adams. Vol. 1. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904).  
 
Algernon, Sidney. Discourses Concerning Government. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1996).  
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/sidney-discourses-concerning-government.  
 
Amar, Akhil Reed. The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction. (New Haven and London:  
Yale University Press, 1998).  
 
Banner, Stuart. How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier. (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 2005). 
 
Bauer, John R. “Merit and popular virtue in the political thought of James Madison, 1783-1788.”  
The Social Science Journal. Vol. 28, Issue 1. (1991).  
 
Beccaria, Cesare. An Essay on Crime and Punishments. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010).  
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf. 
 
Beer, Samuel. To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism. (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1998). 
 
Bendich, Albert M. “Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution.” Berkeley Law Journal.  
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2925&context=californi
alawreview. 
 
Bessler, John D. “Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty,  
and the Abolition Movement.” Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy. Vol. 4, 
Issue 2. (2009).  
 
 
Koslowski 101 
 
Bessler, John D. Cruel & Unusual: The American Death Penalty and the Founders’ Eight  
Amendment. 
 
Bessler, John D. The Birth of American Law: An Italian Philosopher and the American  
Revolution. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2014). 
 
Bessler, John. “The Italian Enlightenment and the American Revolution: Cesare Beccaria’s  
Forgotten Influence on American Law.” Journal of Public Law and Policy. Vol. 37, Issue 
1. (2016). 
Bessler, John. The Birth of American Law: An Italian Philosopher and the American Revolution.  
(Carolina Academic Press: Durham, 2014).  
 
Blasi, Joseph; Freeman, Richard; and, Kruse, Douglas L. The Citizen’s Share. (New Haven and  
London: Yale University Press, 2013). 
 
Bradford, Colin I. “Individual dignity, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and the future of American  
politics.” The Brookings Institution. July 2, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2018/07/02/individual-dignity-alexandra-ocasio-cortez-and-the-future-of-american-
politics/.  
 
Brennan, William J. “Speech given at the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown  
University.” October 12, 1985. PBS. 
 
Brooks, Arthur C. “The Dignity Deficit.” Foreign Affairs. March/April 2017.  
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-13/dignity-deficit.  
 
Bruni, Leonardo. “Laudatio Florentinae Urbis or Panegyric to the City of Florence.” University  
of York. https://www.york.ac.uk/teaching/history/pjpg/bruni.pdf.  
 
Bryan, William Jennings. In His Image. (Project Gutenberg EBook Press, 2004).  
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/12744/pg12744-images.html.  
 
Chafetz, Josh. Democracy’s Privileged Few. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).  
 
Clarke, Samuel, 1675-1729, and Pre-1801 Imprint Collection (Library of Congress). The Works  
of Samuel Clarke. (London: Printed for J. and P. Knapton, 1738). Vol. 1. 
 
Clarke, Samuel. A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God. 1704-1705.  
(Glasgow: Printed for Richard Griffin and Co., 1823).  
 
Continental Congress of the United States. “Comments on Instructions to Peace Commissioners,  
August 8, 1782.” National Archives. 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-05-02-0012.  
 
Koslowski 102 
 
Cosby, Brian H.. John Flavel : Puritan Life and Thought in Stuart England. (Lanham, MD:  
Lexington Books, 2013.) 
 
Cuddihy, William J. The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602 - 1791. (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2009.) Oxford Scholarship Online, 2009. doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367195.001.0001. 
 
Cuomo, Mario. More than Words: The Speeches of Mario Cuomo. (St. Martin’s Press: New  
York, 1994).  
Dallas, Alexander James. “Features of Mr. Jay’s treaty. To which is annexed a view of the  
commerce of the United States, as it stands at present, and as it is fixed by Mr. Jay’s 
treaty.” https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=evans;cc=evans;view=text;idno=N21681.0001.001;rgn=div2;node=N21681.0001.
001:4.4.  
 
De Vergennes, Gravier; and Franklin, Benjamin. “Exchange of Notes Referring to Articles 2 and  
3 of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France of February 6, 1778.” The Avalon 
Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fr-1784.asp.  
 
Debes, Remy. Dignity: A History. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2017).  
 
Diamond, Martin. “The American Idea of Equality: The View from the Founding.” The Review  
of Politics. Vol. 38, No. 3. (July 1976). 
  
Dworkin, Ronald. Justice for Hedgehogs. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
 
Edited by Cogan, Neil H. et al. The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and  
Origins. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
 
Edwards, Jonathan and Piper, John, ed.. God’s Passion for His Glory. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway  
Books, 1998). 
 
Edwards, Jonathan. The Nature of True Virtue. 1765. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,  
1960). 
 
Emerton, Ephraim. Humanism and Tyranny: Studies in the Italian Trecento. (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1925).  
 
Emmons, Nathaniel. The Dignity of Man, a Discourse. Franklin, Massachusetts, March 1, 1787.  
(Providence RI: Printed by Bennet Wheeler, 1787). 
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N15906.0001.001. 
 
Euripides. Hecuba. trans. Harrison. (Faber and Faber: London, 2005).  
 
Fields, William S. and Hardy, David T. “The Third Amendment and the Issue of the  
Koslowski 103 
 
Maintenance of Standing Armies: A Legal History.” The American Journal of Legal 
History. Vol. 35, No. 4. (Oct. 1991). 
 
Fischer, David Hackett. Washington’s Crossing. (Oxford University Press, 2006).  
 
Fitzgerald, Frances. The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America. (New York: Simon &  
Schuster, 2017).  
 
Flavel, John. Pneumatologia: A Treatise on the Soul of Man. (Grand Rapids: Christian Classics  
Ethereal Library). https://www.ccel.org/ccel/f/flavel/pneum/cache/pneum.pdf. 
 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810). 
 
Franklin, Benjamin. The Works of Benjamin Franklin, including the Private as well as the  
Official and Scientific Correspondence, together with the Unmutilated and Correct 
Version of the Autobiography. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904). Vol. 1. 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/franklin-the-works-of-benjamin-franklin-vol-i-
autobiography-letters-and-misc-writings-1725-1734. 
 
Frymer, Paul. Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion.  
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017). 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. (Farrar,  
Straus, and Giroux: New York, 2014). 
 
Fuller, Robert W. Somebodies and Nobodies: Overcoming the Abuse of Rank. (New Society  
Publishers: Gabriola Island, 2004).  
 
George Washington, The Writings of George Washington. (New York and London: G. P.  
Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. XI. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/washington-the-writings-
of-george-washington-vol-xi-1785-1790/simple.  
 
Gopnik, Adam. A Thousand Small Sanities. (Basic Books: New York, 2018). 
 
Gordon, Thomas, and Trenchard, John. Cato’s Letters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious,  
and Other Important Subjects. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995). Vol. 1. 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/trenchard-catos-letters-4-vols-in-2-lf-ed.  
 
Gorondi, Pablo. “Hungary unveils memorial to crash that killed Polish leader.” The Seattle  
Times. April 6, 2018. https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/hungary-unveils-
memorial-to-crash-that-killed-polish-leader/. 
 
Hamilton, Alexander. “Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and  
Character of John Adams, [October 24, 1800].” National Archives. 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-25-02-0110-0002.  
 
Koslowski 104 
 
Hamilton, Alexander. “The Farmer Refuted, &C. (1775).” National Archives.  
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0057.  
 
Hamilton, Alexander. The Works of Alexander Hamilton. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,  
1904). Vol. 4. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hamilton-the-works-of-alexander-hamilton-
federal-edition-vol-4.  
 
Hamilton, Alexander; Jay, John; and, Madison, James. The Federalist Papers. (New York:  
Signet Classic, 2003).  
 
Harding, Bethany. “‘Breaking Up, and Moving Westward’: The Search for Identity in Post- 
Colonial America, 1787-1828.” Marquette University. Dissertations. Paper 502. (2009).  
https://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1476&context=dissertati
ons_mu.  
Harrington, James. The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington, with an Account of His  
Life by John Toland. (London” Becket and Cadell, 1771). 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/harrington-the-oceana-and-other-works. 
 
Hay, George. “An Essay on the Liberty of the Press.” 1799.  
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N26756.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext.  
 
Heimart, Alan. Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolution.  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). 
 
Hollitz, John. Contending Voices, Volume I: To 1877. (New York: Cengage Learning, 2016). 
 
Horowitz, Maryanne Cline. Seeds of Virtue and Knowledge. (Princeton: Princeton University  
Press, 1998). 
 
Huang, Hsin-po and Hsiao Sherry. “’National dignity’ rules passed.” Taipei Times. July 4, 2019.  
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/07/04/2003718085. 
 
Hutson, James H. “John Adams’ Title Campaign.” The New England Quarterly. Vol. 41, No. 1.  
(March 1968).  
 
Hyland, William G. George Mason: The Founding Father Who Gave Us the Bill of Rights.  
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery History, 2019). 
 
James Harrington, The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington, with an Account of His  
Life by John Toland. (London: Becket and Cadell, 1771). 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/harrington-the-oceana-and-other-works.  
 
Jay, John. The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,  
1890-93). Vol. 3. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jay-the-correspondence-and-public-
papers-of-john-jay-vol-3-1782-1793.  
 
Koslowski 105 
 
 
 
Jefferson, Thomas and Mason, George. “A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.” June 18,  
1779. National Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-
0132-0004-0082. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “From Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, 18 August 1799.” National  
Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-31-02-0142.  
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “From Thomas Jefferson to Stevens Thomas Mason, 11 October 1798.”  
National Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-30-02-0375.  
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “Jefferson’s Observations on DéMeunier’s Manuscript.” June 22, 1786.  
National Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0001-
0005. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury.” October 11-December 9, 1776. National  
Archives https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0222-0007.   
 
Jefferson, Thomas. The Works of Thomas Jefferson. (New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s  
Sons, 1904-5). Vol. 4. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jefferson-the-works-vol-4-notes-
on-virginia-ii-correspondence-1782-1786.   
 
Judis, John B. The Populist Explosion. (Columbia Global Reports: New York, 2016). 
 
Kakutani, Michiko. “The 2010s Were the End of Normal.” The New York Times. December 27,  
2019. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/27/opinion/sunday/2010s-america-
trump.html.  
 
Kennedy, John F. “Address of John F. Kennedy Upon Accepting the Liberal Party Nomination  
for President.” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.  New York City, 
New York. September 14, 1960. 
 
Kerber, Linda K. “The Republican Mother: Women and the Enlightenment – An American  
Perspective.” American Quarterly. Vo. 28, No. 2. (Summer 1976).  
 
King, Peter and Ward, Richard. “Rethinking the Bloody Code in Eighteenth-Century Britain:  
Capital Punishment at the Centre and on the Periphery.” Past & Present, Volume 228, 
Issue 1. August 2015.  
 
King, Peter. Punishing the Criminal Corpse, 1700-1840. (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2017).  
 
Klein, Ezra. “American democracy has faced worse threats than Donald Trump.” Vox. May 10,  
2018. https://www.vox.com/2018/5/10/17147338/donald-trump-illiberal-undemocratic-
elections-politics.  
 
Koslowski 106 
 
 
 
Knox, Henry. “To George Washington from Henry Knox, 15 February 1790.” National  
Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0085.  
 
Knox, Henry. “To George Washington from Henry Knox, 7 July 1789.” National Archives.  
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0067.  
 
Knox, Henry. “To George Washington from Henry Knox, July 7, 1789.” National Archives.  
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0068#GEWN-05-03-02-
0068-fn-0003.  
 
Li, Pei. “In Bid to Protect ‘National Dignity,’ China Cracks Down on Foreign Place Names.”  
The Wall Street Journal. March 23, 2016. 
https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/03/23/in-bid-to-protect-national-dignity-china-
cracks-down-on-foreign-place-names/.  
 
Lincoln, Abraham. Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. The Abraham Lincoln Association.  
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/ 
 
Locke, John. The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes. (London: Rivington, 1824 12th ed.).  
Vols. 1-4. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-the-works-vol-1-an-essay-concerning-
human-understanding-part-1.  
 
Madison, James et al. “The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 reported by James  
Madison: July 1825.” National Archives. https://archive.is/FuAPH.  
 
Madison, James. The Debates in the Several State Conventions. (Washington, D.C.: Published by  
Taylor & Maury, 1854). 
 
Madison, James. The Writings of James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s  
Sons, 1900). Vol. 6. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-writings-vol-6-1790-
1802 
 
May, Henry F. The Enlightenment in America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
 
Meyer, D. H. “The Uniqueness of the American Enlightenment.” American Quarterly. Vol. 28,  
No. 2. (Summer 1976).  
 
Milton, John. The Prose Works of John Milton. (Philadelphia: John W. Moore, 1847). Vol. 1.  
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/milton-the-prose-works-of-john-milton-vol-1. 
 
Mirandola, Pica della. Oration on the Dignity of Man. http://bactra.org/Mirandola/.  
 
Molesworth, Robert. “The Principles of a Real Whig (1705).” (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,  
2011). https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/realwhig.  
Koslowski 107 
 
 
 
Monroe, James. “To James Madison From James Monroe; June 13, 1795.” National Archives.   
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-16-02-0017.  
 
Moyle, Walter. “Miscellaneous Letters and Essays, on Several Subjects.” 1694.  
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A42746.0001.001/1:4?rgn=div1;view=fulltext. 
 
Moyle, Walter. Democracy Vindicated, An Essay on the Constitution & Government of the  
Roman State. (Norwich: Printed and Sold by J. March, 1796). 
https://www.constitution.org/moyle/con_rom.htm.  
 
Mrs. Dobson. Petrarch’s View of Human Life. (London: Printed for John Stockdalb, 1741).  
https://archive.org/stream/petrarchsviewhu00petrgoog/petrarchsviewhu00petrgoog_djvu.t
xt.  
 
Nagel, Paul C. One Nation Indivisible. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
 
Niebuhr, Richard H. The Kingdom of God in America. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press,  
1988). 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious  
Equality. (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. The Cosmopolitan Tradition. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2019).  
O’Sullivan, John L. “John L. O’Sullivan on Manifest Destiny, 1839.”  
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/osulliva.htm.   
 
Otis, James. The Collected Political Writings of James Otis, Edited and with an Introduction by  
Richard Samuelson. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2015). 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/collected-political-writings.   
 
Paine, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Paine (1774-1779). (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007).  
Vol. 1. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/paine-the-writings-of-thomas-paine-vol-i-1774-
1779.  
 
Paine, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Paine. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894). Vol. 1.  
https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1776-paine-common-sense-pamphlet.  
 
Parsons, Edward Alexander. “The Letters of Robert R. Livingston.” The American Antiquarian  
Society. https://www.americanantiquarian.org/proceedings/44807068.pdf. 
 
Penn, William. The Political Writings of William Penn. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002).  
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/893.  
 
 
Koslowski 108 
 
 
 
Picciani, Elizabeth. “A Transcription, History, and Analysis of the Pennsylvania Declaration of  
Rights and Constitution of 1776.” Journal of the Penn Manuscript Collective. Vol. 1, 
Issue 1. (Fall/Winter 2017). 
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=manuscript_coll
ective_journal.  
 
Pinker, Steven. “The Stupidity of Dignity.” The New Republic. May 28, 2008.  
https://newrepublic.com/article/64674/the-stupidity-dignity. 
 
Pocock, J.G.A. The Machiavellian Moment. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,  
1975).  
 
Ramsay, David. The History of the American Revolution. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1990).  
Vols. 1-2. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ramsay-the-history-of-the-american-revolution-
vol-1.  
 
Read, Bridget. “28-Year-Old Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Might Just Be the Future of the  
Democratic Party.” Vogue. June 25, 2018. https://www.vogue.com/article/alexandria-
ocasio-cortez-interview-primary-election.  
 
Robbins, Caroline. The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,  
2004). 
 
Rosen, Michael. Dignity: Its History and Meaning. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge,  
2012).  
 
Rowland, Kate Mason. The Life of George Mason. (New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,  
1892).  
 
Rubin, Jennifer. “A timely victory for the rule of law.” The Washington Post. December 11,  
2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/11/win-rule-law/ 
 
Rubio, Marco. “America Needs to Restore Dignity of Work.” The Atlantic. December 13, 2018.  
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/help-working-class-voters-us-must-
value-work/578032/.  
 
Rush, Benjamin. “Considerations on the Injustice and Impolicy of Punishing Murder by Death.”  
The American Museum. https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=evans;idno=N19031.0001.001. 
 
Salladin, James. “Essence and fullness: Evaluating the creator-creature distinction in Jonathan  
Edwards.” Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol. 70, Issue 4. (November 2017). 
 
Shaw, Charles Gray. Value and the Dignity of Human Life. (Boston: The Gorham Press, 1911).  
Koslowski 109 
 
 
 
Smith, James Morton. “The ‘Aurora’ and the Alien and Sedition Laws: Part II: The Editorship of  
William Duane.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography. Vol. 77, No. 2. 
(April 1953). 
 
Smith, James Morton. “The Grass Roots Origins of the Kentucky Resolutions.” The William and  
Mary Quarterly. Vol. 27, No. 2. (April 1970).  
Smith, Rogers M. “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in  
America.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 87, No. 3. September 1993.  
 
Smith, Rogers M. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. (New Haven  
and London: Yale University Press, 1997).  
 
Smith, Rogers M. Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership.  
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003). 
 
Sperling, Gene. “Economic Dignity.” Democracy Journal. No. 52, Spring 2019.  
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/52/economic-dignity/. 
 
Stein, Stephen J. “George Whitefield on Slavery: Some New Evidence.” Church History. Vol.  
42, No. 2. (June 1973). 
 
Stiles, Ezra. The United States elevated to glory and honor. Hartford, Connecticut, May 8th,  
1783. http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N14363.0001.001.  
 
The Essential Antifederalist. Edited by W.B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd. (New York: Rowman &  
Littlefield Publishers, 2003). 
 
Trenchard, John and Gordon, Thomas. Cato’s Letters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious,  
and Other Important Subjects. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995). Vol. 1. 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/trenchard-catos-letters-vol-1-november-5-1720-to-june-
17-1721-lf-ed.  
 
Trinkaus, Charles. In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist  
Thought. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017). 
 
Vining, Richard et al. “Subject of Amendments to the Constitution.” U.S. House of  
Representatives. July 28, 1789. https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-
states/interactives/bill-of-rights/speech/enlarge5.html. 
 
Viser, Matt. “Joe Biden unspools an endless supply of ‘Bidenisms’ on the campaign trail.” The  
Washington Post. January 24, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/joe-biden-
unspools-an-endless-supply-of-biden-isms-on-the-campaign-trail/2020/01/24/475033b4-
3eba-11ea-b90d-5652806c3b3a_story.html. 
 
Koslowski 110 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. Dignity, Rank, and Rights. “The Tanner Lectures on Human Values”.  
Delivered at the University of California, Berkeley. April 21-23, 2009.  
 
Walker, Francis. “The Indian Question.” 1874.  
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/ACK1342.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext.   
 
Washington, George. “December 8, 1795: Seventh Annual Message to Congress.” University of  
Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-
speeches/december-8-1795-seventh-annual-message-congress.   
 
Washington, George. “From George Washington to Patrick Henry, 9 October 1795.” National  
Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-19-02-0024.  
 
Washington, George. “From George Washington to Richard Henderson, June 19, 1788.”  
National Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-06-02-0304.  
 
Washington, George. The Writings of George Washington. (New York and London: G.P.  
Putnam’s Sons, 1889). Vols. 4, 12. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/washington-the-
writings-of-george-washington-vol-iv-1776.  
 
Wesley, John. The Works of The Rev. John Wesley, A.M.. Vol. 7. (London: John Mason, 1840).  
 
Wesley, John. The Works of the Reverend John Wesley. Vol. 2. (New York: Lane & Scott, 1850). 
 
Westerman, Pauline C. “Natural Rights versus Human Dignity: Two Conflicting Traditions.”  
Chapter. In The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
edited by Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, and Dietmar Mieth. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.).  
 
Whitefield, George and Gatiss, Lee, ed.. The Sermons of George Whitefield. 2 vols. (Wheaton,  
IL: Crossway, 2012).  
 
Whitefield, George. Eighteen sermons preached by the late Rev. George Whitefield. (London:  
Printed for and sold by J. Gurney, 1771). 
 
Whitefield, George. The Works of the Reverend George Whitefield. (London: Printed for Edward  
and Charles Dilly, 1771). 
 
Wilson, James. Collected Works of James Wilson.. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007). Vols. 1-2.  
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2072. 
 
Witherspoon, John, Collins, V. Lansing, ed.. Lectures on moral philosophy. (Princeton, N.J.:  
Princeton University Press, 1912).  
 
Witherspoon, John. “The Druid, No. I.” The Pennsylvania Magazine. Philadelphia, May 1776; 2,  
American Periodicals.  
Koslowski 111 
 
 
 
Witherspoon, John. The Works of John Witherspoon, D.D.. Vol. 7. (Edinburgh: Printed for Ogle  
and Aikman, 1805). 
 
Witherspoon, John. The Works of the Rev. John Witherspoon, D.D.. Vol. 4. (Philadelphia:  
Printed by William W. Woodward, 1802).  
Wolf, Martin. “The rise of the populist authoritarians.” Financial Times. January 22, 2019.  
https://www.ft.com/content/4faf6c4e-1d84-11e9-b2f7-97e4dbd3580d.  
 
Wright, Susan. “How to Restore Our National Dignity.” The Bulwark. March 31, 2019.  
https://thebulwark.com/how-to-restore-our-national-dignity/. 
 
Zagarri, Rosemarie. “Morals, Manners, and the Republican Mother.” American Quarterly. Vol.  
44, No. 2. (June 1992).  
 
